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CHANGING THE MARRIAGE EQUATION
DEBORAH A. WIDISS
ABSTRACT
This Article brings together legal, historical, and social science
research to analyze how couples allocate income-producing and domestic
responsibilities. It develops a framework—what I call the “marriage
equation”—that shows how sex-based classifications, (non-sex-specific)
substantive marriage law, and gender norms interrelate to shape these
choices. The marriage equation has changed over time, both reflecting
and engendering societal preferences regarding the optimal allocation of
breadwinning and caretaking responsibilities.
Until fifty years ago, sex-based classifications in family and
employment law aligned with gender norms to enforce an ideology of
separate spheres for men and women. The groundbreaking sex
discrimination cases of the 1970s ended legal distinctions between the
duties of husbands and wives but left largely in place both gender norms
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and substantive rights within marriage, tax, and benefits law that
encourage specialization into breadwinning and caregiving roles. Thus,
contrary to popular conception, the modern marriage equation does not
actually promote equal sharing of these responsibilities. Rather, it still
encourages specialization, although the law is now formally agnostic
about which spouse plays which role. The vast majority of different-sex
couples still follow to some extent traditional gender roles. A body of
emerging social science research suggests that same-sex couples typically
allocate these responsibilities more equally than different-sex couples. But
claims that same-sex couples may therefore serve as a model for differentsex couples improperly ignore that the data sets in these studies predate
legal marriage for same-sex couples. By permitting disaggregation of the
marriage equation to gauge more accurately the relative significance of
sex, gender norms, and substantive marriage law, the new reality of samesex marriage can serve as a natural experiment that should inform both
study design and policy reform.
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INTRODUCTION
“It never ceases to amaze me how many people will say to us, ‘So,
who’s the woman, and who’s the man, in your marriage?’”
—Jason Shumaker, husband to Paul McLoughlin II1
Traditionally, substantive marriage law aligned sex-based
classifications with gender norms. They were collectively coherent and
mutually reinforcing, albeit in a way that subordinated women to men. A
husband was responsible for financially supporting his wife and a wife
owed domestic services to her husband. The groundbreaking sex
discrimination cases of the 1970s required legislatures to strip away
virtually all of the sex-based classifications within marriage law other than
the basic requirement that marriage must be between a man and a woman.2
These decisions have a separate legacy that is often overlooked: although
they prohibited most legal distinctions between the sexes, they left in place
an architecture of marriage, tax, and benefits law that encourages
specialization into breadwinner and caregiver roles.3 Gender norms have
also changed far less than feminist reformers expected. Despite more than
thirty years of formal equality, the vast majority of different-sex marriages
still follow to some extent traditional gender roles.4 Contemporary
litigation over marriage rights for same-sex couples—that is, challenges to
the last significant sex-based classification within marriage law—once
again reconfigures marriage. The new reality of same-sex married couples
does not just advance equality for gays and lesbians; it can also offer a
fresh perspective on efforts to achieve equality within marriage for
(different- and same-sex) couples.
Sex-based classifications within marriage law, gender norms, and nonsex-specific substantive laws of marriage collectively form what I call a
“marriage equation” that shapes how individual couples allocate
responsibility for breadwinning and for caretaking. This Article explores
the connections among these factors and the tensions that can arise when

1. Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Young Gay Rites, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at 28, 35.
2. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding ban on men receiving alimony
unconstitutional); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding ban on widowers receiving
social security benefits unconstitutional).
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part II.C.
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they pull in different directions.5 All three factors of the marriage equation
both reflect and engender societal preferences regarding the “optimal”
division of income-producing and domestic responsibilities. Thus, the
elements of the marriage equation can be used to encourage a particular
allocation of these functions, anywhere along a spectrum bounded at one
end by equal sharing by both spouses of caretaking and breadwinning
responsibilities and at the other by total specialization into separate roles.
Additionally, and importantly, the interrelationship of these factors is
essential in determining whether a normative preference for specialization,
as applied to different-sex couples, is specific or agnostic as to the sex of
the spouse who plays each role.
This Article traces the evolution of the marriage equation over the past
fifty years to show how its factors interrelate in the choices individual
couples make and in the development of public policy. It demonstrates
how assumed or presumed connections between sex-based classifications
and gender norms shape legislative and judicial responses to debates over
marriage policy. The analysis in this Article helps show why reform of
sex-based classifications alone can have little (or arguably even harmful)
effect when not accompanied by corresponding changes in substantive
marriage responsibilities and gender norms.6 In other words, the marriage
equation framework serves as a diagnostic tool that helps analyze
successes and limits of past reforms and that identifies crucial questions
that should shape research and policy design in the future.
The framework also helps explain why and how conversations
regarding proposed recognition of same-sex relationships often focus on
the supposed effect that such recognition would have on gender norms for
different-sex couples. During the 1970s, Phyllis Schlafly and other
opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment successfully used the specter
of gay marriage as one of the potent arguments against the amendment.7
Likewise, in today’s debate, significant opposition to permitting same-sex
couples to marry rests not simply on a definitional understanding of
marriage as a union of man and woman but on a “thicker” gendered
conception of marriage as ideally between a provider husband and a
homemaker wife. Some critics explicitly call for a return to statesanctioned gender roles within marriage; others, who do not go that far,

5. This framework is sketched out in Part I. Part II and Part III use it to analyze decisionmaking by and policy debates regarding different-sex and same-sex couples respectively.
6. See infra Part II.B–D.
7. See PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 89–95 (1977); infra Part
III.A.1.
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worry that state recognition of same-sex marriages8 undermines society’s
gendered expectations of spouses, particularly men’s responsibility to their
wives and children, or hurts children by denying them gendered role
models within the home.9 Courts have proven surprisingly receptive to
such arguments, at least when evaluating legislation under the deferential
“rational basis” standard.10 I have argued previously—as have others—that
the pervasiveness of sex stereotypes in the articulated rationales for
denying same-sex couples access to marriage should be grounds for
holding such laws to be unconstitutional sex discrimination.11
This Article turns the question around, asking not whether sex equality
doctrine developed in the context of different-sex marriages can help
achieve marriage equality for same-sex couples, but rather how marriage
equality for same-sex couples can inform larger questions of sex equality.
Although contemporary proponents of expanded marriage rights shy away
from making such claims,12 some earlier advocates celebrated the
possibility that same-sex marriage could destabilize gendered
understandings of marriage.13 Other commentators and advocates worried
about the potential “co-optive” effect of traditional marriage roles on
same-sex relationships.14 The current moment transforms these arguments
8. The term “same-sex marriage” implies that the status is in some significant way distinct from
(different-sex) marriage. I believe this is incorrect. This Article examines how the reality of same-sex
married couples can change our understanding of marriage generally. However, since phrases such as
“equal access to marriage for same-sex couples” make very clunky sentences, I use the common term
“same-sex marriage.” Cf. M. V. LEE BADGETT, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 14 (2009) (making a similar point regarding
terminology).
9. See infra Part III.A.1.
10. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he Legislature could
rationally proceed on the common-sense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in
the home.”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
legislature was entitled to believe that providing that only opposite-sex couples may marry will
encourage procreation and child-rearing in a ‘traditional’ nuclear family where children tend to
thrive.”).
11. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage
Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in
Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97
(2005); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights:
A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 267–68.
13. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry,
OUT/LOOK NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted with some modifications in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 13 (Suzanne Sherman ed.,
1992).
14. See, e.g., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 14, reprinted with some modifications in LESBIAN AND GAY
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from theoretical debates into real questions being worked out by families
across the country.15 Same-sex couples are permitted to marry or form
legally recognized civil unions or domestic partnerships in a rapidly
growing number of states and localities.16 The questions are therefore
newly salient.17
A burgeoning body of social science suggests that same-sex couples
divide responsibilities for income-producing work and domestic care more
equally and more equitably than different-sex couples.18 Some social
scientists and popular writers have accordingly claimed that the growing
acceptance of same-sex marriage can serve as a model for different-sex
couples struggling to share responsibilities for work and for home care.19

MARRIAGE, PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 20 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992); Nancy
D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
“Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
15. See Press Release, Williams Inst., New Estimate of 50,000 to 80,000 Married Same-Sex
Couples in the U.S. (Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/pressreleases/new-estimate-of-50000-to-80000-married-same-sex-couples-in-the-us (estimating in February
2011, prior to New York legalizing same-sex marriage, that 50,000 same-sex couples had married in
this country, an additional 30,000 same-sex couples living in America had married in other countries,
and that an additional 85,000 same-sex couples had formed civil unions or domestic partnerships in
this country).
16. As of March 2012, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington have legalized same-sex marriage, and
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island have state laws
providing the equivalent of spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state. See Marriage Equality
& Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (July 6, 2011), http://www.hrc
.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf; 2012 Wash. Ch. 3, 2011 Wa. S.B. 6239
(effective June 7, 2012); 2012 Md. Ch. 2, 2012 Md. H.B. 438 (effective Jan. 1, 2013, or upon
resolution of potential disputes relating to any referendums on the Act).
17. A few other legal commentators have explored aspects of the interplay between marriage
rights for same-sex couples and gender roles within different-sex marriages that I discuss. See
Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1 (2010) (articulating multiple
meanings for “marriage” and the extent to which it remains deeply gendered); Mary Anne Case, What
Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199 (2010) (exploring
historical connection between efforts to achieve equality within different-sex marriages and movement
to legalize same-sex marriage); Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.KENT L. REV. 379, 400 (2009) (using the Stoddard/Ettelbrick debate to suggest directions for future
empirical research). Additionally, Nancy Polikoff remains an outspoken critic of marriage as an
objective for same-sex couples, in part because of its patriarchal past and the extent to which it
continues to encourage specialization. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). I share some of her concerns but am
more hopeful that the new reality of marriage rights for same-sex couples may spur positive reforms
for same- and different-sex couples.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See, e.g., Sondra E. Solomon et al., Money, Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples
in Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561,
572 (2005) (“[S]ame-sex couples are a model for ways of equalizing the division of housework.”);
Lisa Belkin, The Way We Live Now: What’s Good for the Kids, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 8, 2009, at
MM9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/magazine/08fob-wwln-t.html (“Heterosexual
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But such claims consistently overlook a key factor: the studies that exist
today use data sets that predate legal marriage for same-sex couples. This
is significant. Numerous aspects of marriage law, and related benefits
laws, continue to encourage specialization into breadwinner and caretaker
roles; this is what I call the “gender” of marriage.20 Within an existing
marriage, a wide range of policies—including tax, social security, and
welfare benefits—reward married couples that have a significant disparity
in their individual incomes, and access to a spouse’s employer-sponsored
healthcare often enables one spouse to exit the paid work force. If a
marriage dissolves, divorce law, while far from a comprehensive safety
net, provides protection to a dependent spouse by awarding that spouse a
share of property and income accumulated during the marriage and, in
some instances, maintenance or alimony payments post-divorce. These
substantive legal rights work in tandem with societal understandings of
what “marriage” means and the personal commitment that spouses make
to each other. In other words, to hearken back to the quotation that opened
this Article, the substantive law of marriage and related benefits, while
formally sex-neutral, may nonetheless encourage spouses to take on
distinct roles of “woman” and “man” even within a same-sex relationship.
But the marriage equation for same-sex couples is different than that
for different-sex couples. For different-sex couples, gender norms work
together with substantive marriage law to encourage specialization. For
same-sex couples, by contrast, a decision to specialize into breadwinning
or caregiving roles means that one member of the couple, at least, is going
“against” gender norms. Same-sex marriage can thus serve as a natural
experiment to help tease out the relative significance of the law of
marriage, as opposed to gender, in how couples allocate responsibilities.
It is not (yet) possible to fully compare same-sex married couples to
different-sex married couples. The federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) denies same-sex couples all of the federal benefits of marriage.21
Additionally, same-sex couples in several states may form civil unions but
not actual marriages. Pending court challenges and legislative reform
efforts suggest that the current variability may be time limited.22 As I have
couples might want to pay attention to the[] results [in such studies]”); Tara Parker-Pope, Gay Unions
Shed Light on Gender in Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at F1 (“[S]ame-sex couples have a
great deal to teach everyone else about marriage and relationships.”).
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
22. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012) (holding California’s constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage
unconstitutional); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding
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written elsewhere, as a matter of constitutional law and fundamental
fairness, I believe that same-sex couples in any state should have the
freedom to marry.23 That said, the current patchwork offers the
opportunity to design qualitative and quantitative studies that assess the
relative significance of state versus federal benefits of marriage and of the
various legal frameworks employed by states. Although it is impossible to
predict precisely what the result of such studies would be, they could offer
a fresh perspective on long-standing debates over the role that law plays in
the choices families make regarding division of breadwinning and
caregiving responsibilities.
In exploring the potential of same-sex marriage to inform other aspects
of marriage policy, I wish to set to the side debates over whether marriage
is a normatively desirable goal for gays and lesbians in particular or for
families in general. In recent years, there has been a renewed discussion
among progressive advocates and commentators about potential costs of
the marriage equality movement.24 Some argue that marriage litigation
diverts money and energy from other advocacy priorities and has inspired
a backlash.25 Others argue that expansion of marriage rights (and
particularly the extent to which advocates for same-sex couples have
valorized aspects of traditional marriage)26 may undermine efforts to
DOMA’s limitation of “marriage” or “spouse” to one man and one woman to violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment), appeal pending; Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding denial of federal benefits under DOMA
unconstitutional), appeal pending; Respect for Marriage Act, H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011), S. 598
112th Cong. (2011) (bills proposing repeal of DOMA).
23. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (arguing equal access to civil marriage is constitutionally compelled
by the fundamental rights branch of equal protection law unless states stop performing civil marriages
entirely); Widiss et al., supra note 11 (arguing unconstitutional sex stereotypes underlie the denial of
marriage rights to same-sex couples).
24. For thoughtful accounts of the progressive critiques on the marriage equality movement, see
Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37, 42–47 (2011) (discussing
“marriage skepticism” grounded in concerns regarding gendered history of marriage, privileging state
regulation of intimacy, and diverting energy from achieving state recognition of diverse family forms);
Schacter, supra note 17, at 389–93 (identifying similar themes in Paula Ettelbrick’s initial critique of
campaign to seek marriage rights); Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two
Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 567 (2009) (tracing historical development of positions pro- and con-marriage initially articulated
by Tom Stoddard and Paula Ettelbrick and concluding the strategies complement each other well).
25. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 339–419 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that backlash to litigation seeking same-sex marriage rights
led to widespread enactment of federal and state DOMAs, contributed to the victory of George W.
Bush, and failed to increase substantially public support for same-sex marriage). But see Scott L.
Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010)
(discussing such critiques before ultimately arguing they are unwarranted).
26. See POLIKOFF, supra note 17, at 98–103.
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achieve recognition of diverse family structures,27 protection of individual
liberties both within and outside of legally recognized relationships,28 or a
more robust government commitment to meet basic needs such as access
to health care or financial support for children.29 I have considerable
sympathy for some of these critiques. Nonetheless, I believe that so long
as civil marriage exists, it should be available to gays and lesbians.30
Additionally, for better or worse, marriage is currently the primary means
of structuring and recognizing family relationships. Tens of thousands of
same-sex couples are now married, and this reality offers the opportunity
to rethink aspects of marriage law more generally.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the marriage
equation framework and its traditional alignment. Applying this
framework, Part II shows that simply removing sex-based classifications
from marriage law, as required by constitutional doctrine developed
during the 1970s, has had limited effects in changing how different-sex
couples apportion responsibility for breadwinning and caregiving. It posits
that the prevalence and persistence of gendered divisions of
responsibilities is due both to social norms and to substantive provisions of
marriage and related benefits law that continue to encourage
specialization. Part III explores a body of sociological research that
substantiates that same-sex couples share income-producing and domestic
responsibilities more equally than different-sex couples but argues that
new studies should specifically explore the effects of marriage on couples’
decision-making. The Conclusion briefly considers how the framework
can inform efforts to achieve equality within marriage for all couples.

27. See, e.g., id. at 123–45 (advocating recognition of families based on commitments to support
or autonomous choices rather than marital default); cf. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family:
Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 (arguing
family law should recognize role of non-parental caregivers); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends With
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (arguing law should recognize care provided and received by
friends).
28. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v.
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004) (criticizing pursuit of marriage equality as limiting freedom
of gays and lesbians).
29. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 167 (2000) (building on Fineman’s proposal of replacing marriage
with a Mother-Child dyad to argue against the gay and lesbian advocacy movement’s focus on
marriage); see also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER].
30. See sources cited supra note 23.
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I. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SEX, GENDER, AND THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
A. The Marriage Equation
Marriage is a legal structure that traditionally has been understood to
simultaneously regulate the family and provide significant social and
communal benefits.31 The state sets rules regarding who may enter (civil)
marriages, whether and how marriages may be dissolved, and what
responsibilities spouses owe to each other—and to their children—during
and after a marriage. Many of these rules seek to ensure children will
receive physical care, education, and financial support, and additionally
that familial caregivers for children receive financial support.32 But law is
only part of the story. Marriage, more than most other legal relationships,
has long been defined as well by societal and cultural expectations and
religious doctrine, as well as by individual preferences.33 And, since many
societies have traditionally limited marriage to the union of one man with
one woman, regulation of marriage is intimately intertwined with
expectations regarding appropriate male and female roles.34
When married couples make decisions regarding how they will share
responsibility for income-producing work and domestic obligations, their
choices will generally fall on a spectrum bounded at one end by equal
sharing of both responsibilities and at the other by complete specialization
into breadwinning and domestic roles. Even if both spouses participate in
the labor market, and even if they rely on paid caregivers or other
domestic workers to support this work, couples must determine what
extent of domestic obligations to “out-source,” which spouse will perform
remaining domestic work, and which spouse will modify a work schedule

31. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex—or
Not at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 276–77 (2000) (identifying social functions of marriage as providing
“efficient and orderly setting” for sexual activity and procreation, social companionship and
psychological support, economic insurance against adversity, and support for caregiving of dependent
children and elderly parents).
32. For a discussion of these issues, and a proposal to move away from marriage as the primary
means of providing for children, see FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 29.
33. See generally, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2009).
34. For a careful review of several historical examples of same-sex “marriages,” see Polikoff,
supra note 14, at 1538–40. Polikoff argues that most of these marriages imported hierarchies that were
similar to the traditional male-female hierarchy within different-sex marriages. See id. At points in
history, polygamy (a marriage of a husband with more than one wife) has been common and it remains
widespread in some parts of the world; polyandry (a marriage of a wife with more than one husband)
has also existed but has been far less common. See ABA Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38
FAM. L.Q. 339, 349–50 (2004).
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when necessary to meet unexpected domestic needs. For many couples,
this negotiation occurs any time a child is too sick to go to school or any
time a major appliance breaks down. Couples who choose to specialize
completely into separate breadwinning and caregiving roles, or to
prioritize labor market participation by one spouse and domestic work by
the other spouse, must also determine which spouse will take on which set
of responsibilities. For any given couple, the choices may shift over time,
or even vary dramatically on a daily or weekly basis. But their choices are
shaped, and sometimes constrained, by societal gender norms and by
substantive marriage law, including any sex-specific obligations that are
imposed on husbands or on wives and non-sex-specific structures that can
encourage specialization or, conversely, equal sharing of domestic and
income-producing responsibilities.35 (Single individuals, and particularly
single parents, face different challenges, in that they must figure out how
to meet both sets of needs largely on their own. The choices faced by
cohabiting couples are often similar to those of married couples, but, as
discussed more fully below, the lack of a formal, legally binding
relationship may play a significant role in how they are resolved.)
These three factors—sex-based classifications within marriage law,
(non-sex-specific) substantive marriage law, and gender norms—
collectively make up what I call the “marriage equation.” Although these
factors are logically distinct, they interrelate. Any individual couple’s
choices will be shaped by all three factors, the extent to which the factors
reinforce or are in tension with each other, and the couple’s assessment of
each factor’s importance. The distinct factors of the marriage equation also
interrelate in shaping government policy. Law expresses, reflects, and
shapes societal norms.36 Shifts in the law can reflect prior evolution in
societal norms—that is, legal changes can “catch up” to societal
changes—or legal changes can be enacted with the expectation and hope
that they will help spur a change in societal norms.37 But evolution of

35. For empirical work assessing significance of gender norms and substantive provisions of
marriage law, see infra Parts II and III.
36. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495
(1992) (arguing that family law expresses and engenders shared norms regarding marriage and
parenthood); cf. Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the
Channelling Function of Family Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007) (arguing that recent
developments, including debates over same-sex marriage, challenge whether shared “core values” still
exist).
37. Legislation is clearly affected by popular attitudes. Many argue that even when interpreting
constitutional provisions, courts also respond to and are influenced by public opinion even if they
sometimes move “in front” of popular consensus. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
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societal norms is not monolithic; some sectors of society can feel strongly
that legal change is warranted or even overdue, while other sectors resist
such change vehemently. As applied to marriage law, there have been
dramatic debates over time, regarding whether there is a single “optimal”
division of responsibilities within marriage; if so, what it is; and further,
whether and how the law should encourage or enforce it.38 In this Article, I
do not seek to establish that a particular allocation is normatively ideal
(although I admit a preference for equal or relatively equal sharing of both
breadwinning and domestic responsibilities by both spouses). Rather, I
seek to articulate more clearly the interaction of the factors within the
marriage equation, demonstrate how at points of transition—such as
debates over the Equal Rights Amendment and marriage rights for samesex couples—proponents and opponents of reform strategically claim and
disclaim these connections, and suggest that empirical work can help
disaggregate the effects of the distinct factors.
Before discussing this evolving terrain, it is important to clarify terms.
In legal cases and commentary, sex and gender are often used
interchangeably.39 In other disciplines, however, “sex” is used to refer to
men and women and the physical differences between them, and “gender”
to refer to the characteristics stereotypically associated with the different
sexes.40 Following this distinction, I am using “sex” to refer to actual sexbased classifications within laws (that is, laws that explicitly distinguish
between men and women or husbands and wives) and “gender” to refer to
the different roles that men and women were traditionally expected to play
within marriage (that is, men as breadwinners and women as
homemakers).
It is usually clear whether a law uses an explicit sex-based
classification; as a more general principle, however, the line between
“sex” and “gender,” and their interaction in choices regarding labor
allocation within a family, is often blurry.41 For example, consider the

Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1323 (2006).
38. See infra Parts II & III.
39. This is in part because former-ACLU-attorney-now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg consciously
chose to articulate her constitutional arguments in terms of “gender” discrimination rather than “sex”
discrimination. As an advocate she believed that her audience would be more comfortable with the
term “gender.” See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
40. For a more comprehensive discussion of the difference, see id. at 10–13.
41. Some theorists, most notably Judith Butler, challenge the underlying assumption that there is
a substantial reality to sexual difference distinct from gendered understandings of sex. See generally
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990).
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choices couples make after the birth of a child. Medical experts typically
estimate that women need four to eight weeks to recover physically from
vaginal childbirth (and potentially longer to recover fully from a cesarean
section or other complications).42 Additionally, if a mother wishes to
breastfeed an infant, it is optimal that she is available to nurse on demand
for at least four weeks.43 These biological facts push many different-sex
couples to prioritize the father’s income-producing work and the mother’s
caretaking work in the period immediately after childbirth. In other words,
the mother goes on maternity leave and the father returns quickly to work.
To most couples, this choice seems “obvious” or “necessary.” But the
salience of even such clear biological differences is shaped by gendered
assumptions. To see this, imagine a mother whose work responsibilities
can be completed via internet-based research, email, and phone. A mother
with such a job would likely find her largely sedentary paid work far less
physically taxing than taking care of a newborn baby. She could likely
complete her primary work responsibilities within a week or two of the
birth (even if she was not yet fully physically recovered). Even if she
wanted to breastfeed the baby, she could “return” to work if she could
telecommute and if someone else took responsibility during the mother’s
work hours for all aspects of newborn care other than nursing. This family
might best meet its collective needs by having the mother return
immediately to paid work and the father take leave.44 But very few couples
ever consider this option. Of course, many women’s jobs would be less
compatible with an immediate return post-childbirth than this hypothetical
one. The fact that most couples choose to allocate primary responsibility
for newborn care to the mother is not surprising. My point is simply to
highlight that even this choice, which reflects “real” biological differences,
also reflects gender.
The further one moves, temporally, from pregnancy, childbirth, and
breastfeeding, the less importance biological differences between men and
women will play in couples’ decision-making regarding the allocation of
42. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 & n.4 (2003).
43. See, e.g., RUTH A. LAWRENCE & ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, BREASTFEEDING: A GUIDE FOR
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 471 (6th ed. 2005) (recommending women intending to breastfeed do not
introduce a bottle until at least four weeks because it interferes with the mother’s “milk-making
rhythm” and may confuse the infant).
44. Under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, fathers, as well as mothers, have a right to
up to twelve weeks unpaid leave upon the birth or adoption of a child. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006).
As discussed more fully below, employers with fewer than fifty employees are not covered under the
law, and some employees may not have worked the requisite amount of hours and months to be
eligible for leave. See infra text accompanying notes 149–50.
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responsibilities. I also note that historically, biological differences and the
putative need to “protect” women and their childbearing role were used as
justifications for far-reaching limitations on women’s autonomy that are
now clearly established as baseless.45 Thus, while it may be that some
differences in men’s and women’s preferences regarding the allocation of
income-producing and caretaking work reflect, or are influenced by,
biological or hormonal distinctions between the sexes, my analysis
generally treats these preferences as “gender”-based distinctions within the
marriage equation.46
“Marriage” is also a complicated term. In discussing the “marriage”
factor of the “marriage equation,” I mean primarily legal marriage and the
legal rights and benefits that flow from it. Procedural requirements
regarding licensing, officiants, and witnesses seek to ensure that it is clear
when a legal marriage has been formed, and it is generally easy to identify
laws that incorporate marital status.47 The analysis below demonstrates
that many aspects of substantive marriage and related benefits law
encourage specialization into breadwinning and caregiving roles. But
“marriage” is far more than a bundle of legal rights. It is an open-ended,
ideally life-long, commitment of two individuals to form a family
together. Thus, even if law in no way encouraged individuals within a
couple to specialize, they might nonetheless choose to develop
complementary responsibilities in accordance with their personal
preferences; likewise, one might express love for a spouse by
subordinating individual interests for the benefit of the family or the
spouse. Moreover, many individuals understand intimacy in gendered
terms and construct gendered identities within such relationships that they

45. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (holding that physical differences between
men and women and the “burdens of motherhood” justified permitting states to regulate the hours
worked by women); cf. Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (arguing that
even regulations based on “real” differences between the sexes, such as pregnancy, may be so
intertwined with judgments about women’s roles that they should be cognizable as sex discrimination).
46. For a recent review of social science literature exploring the complex interactions between
biology and socializing forces in the development of gender roles, see Sheri A. Berenbaum et al., A
Role for Biology in Gender-Related Behavior, 64 SEX ROLES 804 (2011). Emerging research
demonstrates that behavior can itself affect hormonal differences, such as the widely publicized study
that found intensive fathering lowered men’s testosterone levels. See Pam Belluck, Fatherhood Cuts
Testosterone, Study Finds, for Good of the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1.
47. For example, the United States General Accounting Office (renamed as the Government
Accountability Office in 2004) has determined that there are 1,138 federal statutes that use marriage as
a factor in determining eligibility for benefits, rights, or privileges. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
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would not accept or embrace in other contexts.48 For different-sex couples,
it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to disaggregate the legal from
personal, symbolic, and social understandings of marriage. As described
more fully in Part III.C, the variability among states’ recognition of samesex couples’ relationships can help tease apart some of these complexities.
There are, of course, factors outside the marriage equation that may
play a large role in how couples choose to allocate their responsibilities.
The preferences, skills, and experience of each individual member of a
couple are obviously of central importance. The extent to which the family
would face significant economic hardship if one spouse were to drop out
of, or minimize participation in, the paid labor force is likewise key. For
some couples, religious doctrine is a significant factor. And in terms of
legal rights and responsibilities, employment law is also crucial.49 Notably,
all of these other factors likewise both shape and are shaped by societal
and legal understandings of marriage—i.e., the marriage equation. My
claim is not that the factors in the marriage equation alone will necessarily
be dispositive for any given couple, but rather that for most couples, and
for government policy, the factors are a highly significant part of the
decision-making process. Understanding how the equation has changed
over time can therefore help both analyze past reform and identify avenues
for future research and policy development.
B. The Traditional Equation: Aligned and Mutually Reinforcing
Historically, sex-based classifications, gender norms, and substantive
marriage law were collectively coherent, albeit in a way that subordinated
women to men. The three factors of the marriage equation expressed and
enforced as ideal a marriage in which the husband took on primary or full
breadwinning responsibilities and the wife took on primary or full
caretaking responsibilities. Under the doctrine of coverture, which
survived until the mid-nineteenth century, a woman lost her legal identity
upon marriage.50 Husbands bore legal responsibility for supporting their
wives; wives legally owed their husbands services, including housework,

48. See Alicia Brokers Kelly, Negotiating Gender, Vulnerability and Connection in Feminism
and Intimate Partnership Law 32–36 (Oct. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(gathering sources).
49. The analysis below explores aspects of how employment law intersects with marriage law,
but a comprehensive consideration of the employment side of the ledger is beyond the scope of this
project.
50. For a detailed history of the doctrine of coverture and its evolution in this country, see
generally NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000).
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childcare, and sexual services.51 Wives could not own property or make
contracts individually. In many cases, wives were not even responsible for
their own criminal actions and husbands were granted a corresponding
authority to regulate their wives’ conduct so as not to incur liability
themselves. Most married women did not work outside the home; if they
did, their husbands owned their salaries.52
Although the Married Women’s Property Acts and other nineteenthcentury reforms dismantled the legal fiction that women lost individual
identity upon marriage, numerous other sex-based distinctions persisted in
the law until the 1970s. Wives were required to take their husbands’
names and to follow their husbands if they moved.53 Upon divorce,
dependent wives, but not husbands, could receive alimony. 54 Under the
tender-years doctrine, mothers were presumptively awarded custody of
young children.55 Many of the distinctions in family law were putatively
for women’s benefit, but they were accompanied by other (often sexneutral) provisions that dramatically limited wives’ options and authority,
such as the title-based system of marital property that generally assigned
ownership exclusively to the breadwinning spouse.56
Employment laws reinforced the male breadwinner/female caretaker
division of responsibilities. Women were barred from working in specific
jobs or professions.57 Special “protective” labor legislation limited the
number of hours that women, but not men, could work.58 And employers
routinely paid married men more than women performing the same work,

51. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1456
(1992).
52. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 442–45 (1765);
COTT, supra note 50, at 11–12.
53. See generally Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in
Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893 (2010) (detailed exploration of the history and ongoing pervasiveness of
gendered distinctions in marital naming law and conventions).
54. See Norma Basch, The Emerging Legal History of Women in the United States: Property,
Divorce, and the Constitution, 12 SIGNS 97, 106 (1986) (“Only women could receive alimony.”); Mary
Kay Kisthardt, Re-Thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal
Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 61, 66–67 (2008) (discussing various
historical justifications for alimony, including coverture and dower and as damages for husband’s
breach of marital contract).
55. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal PolicyMaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 112–13 (1987).
56. See, e.g., COTT, supra note 50, at 168–79.
57. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan law forbidding
female bartenders unless they were the wife or daughter of a male owner).
58. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17, 423 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law
limiting the number of hours a woman could work to ten hours per day).
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in recognition of their presumed responsibilities to provide for a family.59
(As Henry Ford explained when doubling the rate paid to married men,
“[T]he man does the work in the shop, but his wife does the work in the
home. The shop must pay them both.”60) Additionally, it was common for
employers to adopt formal or informal “marriage bars” which prohibited
the hiring and/or retention of married women.61 Employers also routinely
fired women, or required them to take unpaid leave without job security,
when they became pregnant, even if they remained physically able to
complete their work.62
Government social insurance programs, largely created during the
1930s through 1950s, were also structured to meet the needs of the
idealized family of a male breadwinner providing for his dependent wife
and children.63 Upon death or retirement of a spouse, dependent wives, but
not husbands, could receive social security benefits.64 Unemployment
insurance provided protection for children of out-of-work fathers but not
out-of-work mothers.65 These public programs were reinforced by a rapid
growth of employer-sponsored benefits that likewise were structured to
meet the needs of the male breadwinner/female caretaker families. Thus,
for example, health insurance benefits were typically made available to an
employee and to his wife and children. Pension benefits were made

59. See, e.g., Allan Carlson, Rise and Fall of the American Family Wage, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
556, 562–66 (2007).
60. See id. at 563 (quoting HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 123 (1922)).
61. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
AMERICAN WOMEN 160–79 (1990).
62. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of
Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 452 (2011) (discussing how this remained common
practice into the 1970s).
63. This is so familiar in this country as to seem natural, but it is important to note that some
other countries have met these needs through programs that do not piggyback on the marital
relationship as the presumptive primary basis for meeting the needs of dependent caretakers and
children. See, e.g., JILL S. QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1–2 (1988) (contrasting the development of the
American social security system with roughly concurrent development in many European countries of
uniform universal pensions); cf. Jochen Clasen & Wim van Oorschot, Changing Principles in
European Social Security, 4/2 EUR. J. OF SOC. SEC. 89 (2002) (discussing more recent evolution of
European social security programs that incorporate elements of universalism, need-based assessment,
and reciprocity).
64. Cf. URBAN INST., SOCIAL SECURITY: OUT OF STEP WITH THE MODERN FAMILY 7 (2000)
(describing the origins of spousal benefit). For an insightful exploration of the pervasiveness of gender
norms in the structuring of social security, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools:
The Construction of the Social Security Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY
87 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995).
65. Cf. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (making the Aid to Families with Dependant
Children, Unemployed Father program of the Social Security Act, which previously applied only to
fathers, apply to either parent).
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available to an employee and to his wife and children. Employers could
legally limit spousal benefits to female wives of male employees on the
assumption that male spouses of female employees would (or at least
should) be working themselves and thus receiving benefits through their
own employment.66
The body of family law, employment law, and related benefits law
interacted to assign the husband/father primary responsibility for wage
earning and the wife/mother primary responsibility for domestic care. This
division privatized responsibility for the care and growth of children, by
seeking to ensure that children would receive both financial support and
appropriate care. These legal rights reinforced and were in turn
strengthened by the separate spheres ideology: men should express and
prove their masculinity by shouldering the breadwinning responsibilities;
women should express and prove their femininity by providing nurturing
care and support. Well into the twentieth century, limitations on women’s
economic freedom and pervasive legal distinctions between the sexes were
upheld as constitutional on the ground that they appropriately reflected the
societal understanding that the preferred and proper place for women was
in the home.67
Homer Clark characterized the significance of sex-specific
responsibilities in family law in a leading domestic relations treatise
published in 1968 as follows:
These rules acquire much of their force and vitality from the fact
that they construct a model of correct behavior. They are moral
precepts . . . [that] describe the traditional roles of husband and
wife. The husband is to provide the family with food, clothing,
shelter, and as many amenities of life as he can manage. . . . The
wife is to be mistress of the household, maintaining the home with
the resources furnished by the husband, and caring for the children.
A reading of contemporary judicial opinions leaves the impression
that these rules have not changed over the last two hundred years, in
spite of the changes in the legal position of the married women

66. Cf. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 n.22 (1983)
(citing post-Title VII EEOC decisions holding disparate benefits for spouses of male and female
employees unlawful).
67. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (permitting prohibition on female
bartenders except where provided sufficient oversight by husband or father); cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (upholding presumptive exclusion of women from jury service on the ground
that they are “still regarded as the center of home and family life”).
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carried through in the Nineteenth Century and her social and
economic position in this century.68
Sex-based classifications established substantive rights within marriage
and related benefits law that accorded with the normative ideal of male
breadwinners and female caretakers. Although the system had an internal,
mutually reinforcing logic, it limited women’s and men’s freedom to
choose how to structure their family relationships, characterizing women
or men who sought a different role as both “unnatural” and failing to meet
their legal responsibilities. It put women in a position that was financially
dependent on men and often left women and children vulnerable to
inadequate support, particularly in the event of divorce. The reforms of the
1970s eliminated the role that sex-based classifications played in enforcing
the traditional gendered divide. It was expected that these changes would
in turn transform the gendered ideology that underlay them. This has
proven an elusive goal.
II. DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES
A. The Demise of (Most) Sex-Based Classifications
In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing women’s movement challenged the
separate spheres ideology that was embodied and enforced by the sexbased classifications, gender norms, and substantive law that formed the
traditional marriage equation. Liberal feminists at the time re-imagined the
idealized marriage not as a union of complementary opposites—in which
men specialized in breadwinning and women in caretaking—but rather as
a partnership in which both men and women would participate in the paid
workplace and share the responsibilities of childcare and housework.69 The
enactment, in 1963, of the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits sex
discrimination in salary,70 and, in 1964, of Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination in employment more generally,71 were significant steps

68. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 181, 182
(1968).
69. See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, TASK FORCE ON THE FAMILY (1967), reprinted in
FEMINIST CHRONICLES: 1953–1993 201 (Toni Carabillo et al. eds., 1993) (“The basic ideological goal
of NOW is a society in which men and women have an equitable balance in the time and interest with
which they participate in work, family and community. NOW should seek and advocate personal and
institutional measures which would reduce the disproportionate involvement of men in work at the
expense of meaningful participation in family and community, and the disproportionate involvement
of women in family at the expense of participation in work and community.”).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
71. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
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forward in removing the explicit impediments to women’s paid
employment. Courts quickly (for better or worse) interpreted these new
laws to preclude sex-specific “protective” labor legislation, thus
functionally eliminating what had been the basis for some feminist and
progressive advocates’ opposition to an Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA).72 In the early 1970s, feminists rallied around the ERA to challenge
the sex-specific provisions in marriage and related benefits laws that were
still largely in place.
The ERA would have amended the Constitution to provide that
“[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.”73 In 1971 and 1972,
when the ERA was debated and ultimately passed by Congress, the
Supreme Court had not yet held that sex-based classifications within the
law triggered any particular concern under the Equal Protection Clause;
accordingly, under then-governing constitutional law principles, such
classifications could be used so long as there was any kind of rational
justification for them.74 As discussed above, the sex-based classifications
in family law had been easily upheld as justifiable expressions of the
traditional norm that men were responsible for breadwinning and women
for caretaking.75
Enactment of the ERA would have changed this analysis. The likely
effect of the amendment would have been to raise the level of scrutiny
afforded to sex-based classifications.76 Proponents of the ERA suggested
that some existing sex-based classifications—such as those concerning
military service and criminal rape—would be permissible even under more
searching standards but that most sex-based classifications within family
law would need to be modified.77 For example, states would need to make

72. See generally, e.g., Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An
Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209 (1998); Dinner, supra note 62,
at 444–47.
73. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 872 (1971). This article, written by Yale Law Professor Thomas
Emerson and several of his students, analyzed the likely effects of the proposed amendment. It was
highly influential and large portions were read verbatim into the Congressional record during debates
on the amendment. See 118 CONG. REC. 9517–9522 (1972).
74. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (permitting sex-based classifications
so long as “basis in reason” could be conceived). In 1971, the Court held for the first time that a sexbased classification violated the Equal Protection Clause but did so under a rational basis standard. See
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72–73, 76–77 (1971) (holding Idaho law that preferred males as
administrators of estates for individuals who died intestate violated the Equal Protection Clause).
75. See supra text accompanying note 67.
76. See Brown et al., supra note 73, at 875.
77. See id. at 936–54.
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alimony available to both dependent wives and dependent husbands, or
eliminate it entirely.78 But the ERA itself would not have foreclosed postdivorce support for dependent spouses. Rather, an influential analysis of
the proposed amendment suggested that alimony laws could be written to
provide “special protection” to a spouse who had been, or continued to be,
out of the workforce in order to provide care for a child.79 In other words,
it would not have mandated that men take on domestic or that women take
on breadwinning responsibilities.
The marriage equation lens helps make the possibility and limitations
of this approach clear. As discussed above, all three factors of the marriage
equation—sex-based classifications, gender norms, and substantive
marriage law—historically reinforced separate spheres for men and
women by encouraging or requiring distinct roles. If the primary objective
of reform was to move from legally enforced specialization to equal
sharing of domestic and income-producing responsibilities, the most
effective means of doing so would have been to reform both the sex piece
of the equation and the marriage piece of the equation and hope that these
combined changes would spur couples to share responsibilities and help
break down gender norms. In other words, it would have been more
effective to not only remove sex-based classifications but also all the nonsex-specific elements of marriage law that likewise encouraged
specialization.80
Liberal feminist advocacy at the time, however, prioritized reform only
of the “sex” piece of the equation—that is, the sex-specific laws that
imposed distinct obligations on husbands and wives. In part, this probably
reflects an accurate gauge of what was politically possible. It also
highlights the tightrope reformers walked, and one that continues to be a
challenge today. Significant changes to the non-sex-specific incentives
that encouraged or responded to specialization within marriage, such as
social security benefits for dependent spouses, would disadvantage the
(many) women who remained in marriages that embraced traditional
gender roles. The National Organization for Women (NOW) floated a few
trial balloons regarding more substantive reforms of marriage law, and
some radical feminists groups denounced marriage entirely as

78. See id. at 951–53.
79. Id. at 952. NOW took a similar position. See NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, ERA POSITION
PAPER (1967), reprinted in FEMINIST CHRONICLES: 1953–1993 182, 189 (Toni Carabillo et al. eds.,
1993).
80. See infra Part II.B.
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fundamentally flawed by its patriarchal past.81 But, other than its ERA
advocacy, NOW (which was then the leading “mainstream” feminist
organization) sought to achieve its objective of men and women sharing
work and family responsibilities primarily through reforms such as
government support for childcare, increased workplace accommodation of
caregiving responsibilities, and individual control of reproductive life,
rather than reform of substantive aspects of marriage and related benefits
law that protected dependent spouses.82
Opponents of the ERA, by contrast, strategically used the interaction
among sex, gender, and substantive marriage law to argue against the
amendment. In Congress, Senator Sam Ervin took the lead in opposing the
amendment, with arguments that two historians have characterized as a
“plea[] for the traditional view of women in which gender (culture) and
sex (anatomy) are fused.”83 He proposed amendments to the ERA that
would have permitted sex-based classifications to remain in any laws that
were “reasonably designed to . . . enable [women] to perform their duties
as homemakers or mothers.”84 Although Ervin’s efforts were unsuccessful,
and the ERA easily passed both houses of Congress, his speeches were
subsequently reprinted and circulated widely in the efforts to stop
ratification by the states.
Phyllis Schlafly, who led the grassroots opposition movement, likewise
elided the three elements of the marriage equation. She characterized the
ERA as an assault on homemakers, something that would deprive them of
legal protection and undermine their status within society. In her first
published attack on the ERA, she contended that:
Women’s lib is a total assault on the role of the American woman as
wife and mother, and on the family as the basic unit of society.
Women’s libbers are trying to make wives and mothers unhappy

81. See, e.g., ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967–1975
170 (1989) (describing protest which characterized marriage as making women “prisoner[s]” of their
husbands).
82. NOW’s 1967 Task Force on the Family identifies universal childcare as the top priority to
implement equitable sharing between men and women of domestic and income-producing
responsibilities. Of the twelve measures it recommended to achieve this objective, five related to
employment law; two to education; one to reproductive freedom; one to childcare; one to no-fault
divorce; and two to changes in social security or tax law that would decrease the extent to which they
encourage couples to specialize. See NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, TASK FORCE ON THE FAMILY, supra
note 69, at 201–04.
83. DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF
ERA 45 (1990).
84. Equal Rights 1970: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 8 (1970) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
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with their career, to make them feel that they are ‘second-class
citizens’ and ‘abject slaves.’ Women’s libbers are promoting free
sex instead of the ‘slavery’ of marriage. They are promoting Federal
‘day-care centers’ for babies instead of homes. They are promoting
abortions instead of families.85
In subsequent newsletters, and in her 1977 book The Power of the Positive
Woman, Schlafly developed these themes. Ignoring the fact that the right
to support was almost impossible to enforce, Schlafly argued that the ERA
would abolish the “most basic and precious legal right that wives now
enjoy: the right be a full-time homemaker.”86 Referencing an Ohio report
that suggested that the ERA might require the state to provide childcare
services to ensure that mothers, like fathers, had “freedom” to engage in
activities outside the home, Schlafly contended that “[e]limination of the
role of ‘mother’ is a major objective of the women’s liberation
movement.”87 Schlafly argued that these and other legal developments
advocated by some ERA supporters—such as requiring social security
taxes be paid on the contributions made by homemakers—would
collectively force women out of the home and were part of an effort to
“deliberately degrade[] the homemaker and hack[] away at her sense of
self-worth and pride and pleasure in being female.”88 The underlying legal
analysis in many of these points is debatable, but Schlafly’s arguments,
not surprisingly, were extremely successful in mobilizing many
homemakers to oppose the ERA.
The key thing for purposes of this discussion is to note how Schlafly’s
claims merged removal of sex-based classifications within law—that is,
the distinctions between husbands’ and wives’ rights and
responsibilities—with substantive reform of marriage law and gender
norms. The ERA would not have required abandonment of alimony or
support provisions. Thus, enactment of the ERA would not have ended the
“right to be a full-time homemaker” (to the extent any such right ever
existed). It simply would have permitted either men or women to play that
role. NOW and other feminists actually advocated other reforms that were
intended to increase the security that homemakers would have upon
85. Phyllis Schlafly, What’s Wrong with “Equal Rights” for Women, 5 PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP.
3–4 (1972) (quoted in Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to
Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1876 (2006)).
86. SCHLAFLY, supra note 7, at 79.
87. Id. at 87.
88. Id. at 69.
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divorce.89 But Schlafly effectively elided distinctions between “sex,”
“marriage,” and “gender” (“the pleasure in being female”) to make her
larger point. Historians credit widespread resistance to changing the
underlying gender norms as key in defeating the amendment.90
As the ERA was being debated and as efforts to enact it eventually
ground to a halt, liberal feminists, led by Ruth Bader Ginsburg as director
of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, successfully argued that the sexbased classifications within family law were unconstitutional under the
existing Equal Protection Clause.91 In Reed v. Reed92—a challenge to an
Idaho law that established a presumption in favor of men over women in
the appointment of administrators of estates—the Court first held that such
distinctions could violate the Constitution.93 The Court went on to
announce in 1976 that sex-based classifications merited heightened
scrutiny94 (although not as rigorous as that applied to race-based
classifications). The Court struck down a host of sex-based classifications
that enforced the separate spheres ideology of the family: a presumption
that unwed fathers, but not mothers, were inadequate caregivers for their
children;95 a presumption that wives, but not husbands, of service
members were dependent on their spouses;96 a categorical ban on
widowers, but not widows, with minor children receiving social security
survivors’ benefits;97 a law that extended child support for boys until age
twenty-one but for girls only until age eighteen;98 a law that provided
alimony upon divorce for women but not for men;99 and a law that
provided benefits to children of unemployed fathers, but not unemployed
89. See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, ERA POSITION PAPER, supra note 79, at 189.
90. See generally, e.g., JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); MATHEWS & DE
HART, supra note 83; Peggy Pascoe, Sex, Gender, and Same-Sex Marriage, in IS ACADEMIC FEMINISM
DEAD? THEORY IN PRACTICE 86, 96–102 (Soc. Justice Grp. at The Ctr. for Advanced Feminist Studies,
Univ. of Minn. ed., 2000).
91. For a fascinating exploration of Ginsburg’s litigation strategy and its connection to the
women’s and gay liberation movements, see Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).
92. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
93. Id.
94. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (articulating a “requirement that the genderbased difference [in a law] be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective”).
95. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In that case, the Court held that the father’s due
process rights were violated by the failure to provide him with an opportunity to contest the state’s
determination of neglect, but also identified an “equal protection” violation in the distinction between
unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers in protection of these procedural interests. See id. at 649.
96. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
97. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
98. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
99. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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mothers100 (as well as a law that permitted girls to buy low-alcohol beer at
a younger age than boys).101 These decisions collectively dismantled
almost all sex-based distinctions within marriage law and related benefits
laws by making the responsibilities of husbands and wives identical and
reciprocal. Under modern sex discrimination law, sex-based classifications
are almost always invalid unless they respond to “real” physical
differences between the sexes.102
Leading constitutional scholars characterize this body of constitutional
case law as a “de facto ERA”103 that has accomplished “virtually
everything the ERA would have accomplished.”104 This may be correct,
but it is a relatively thin understanding of the potential promise of the
ERA. Supporters believed—and hoped—that the ERA would not merely
strip sex-based classifications from the law. They hoped that it would also
spur a more general realignment of gender norms within the family, and
within society as a whole, that would lead to a more equal sharing of
responsibilities at home as well as at work. Whether or not this would
have occurred is impossible to assess definitively.105
What is clear, however, is that the body of Supreme Court decisions
did not effect a general transformation in gender roles. That is, the Court
made clear that the government could not rely upon generalizations
regarding appropriate roles for men and women, or the empirical reality
that far more women than men were dependent on their spouses for
economic support, as justification for sex-specific classifications in the

100. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
101. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
102. These include laws regulating statutory rape, see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981) (plurality opinion); birth, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); and military service, see
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Notably, several justices in each case argued that the sexbased classifications in each law reflected overbroad stereotypes and should be held unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89–91
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also text
accompanying supra notes 41–46 (discussing the difficulty of drawing lines between “gender” and
“sex”).
103. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 984–85
(2002) (“The social changes that did not quite produce the Equal Rights Amendment produced a de
facto ERA in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.”).
104. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 419, 502 (2001); see also, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1476–77 (2001) (“Today, it is difficult to identify any respect
in which constitutional law is different from what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted.”).
105. Cf. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 90, at 2 (“[The ERA’s] direct effects would have been slight,
but its indirect effects on both judges and legislators would probably have led in the long run to
interpretations of existing laws and enactment of new laws that would have benefited women.”).
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law.106 The Court held that the separate spheres ideology that “the female
[is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas” expressed impermissible
sex stereotypes.107 But it did not require the government to take steps to
affirmatively dismantle the gendered division of responsibility or to
implement policies that would encourage such realignment.108 In fact,
Reva Siegel and Cary Franklin argue that the debates over the ERA—and
the popular backlash against it—caused the attorneys in the foundational
constitutional sex discrimination cases to cabin the scope of the changes
they sought.109
Many commentators therefore look back at this series of decisions as a
rather hollow victory.110 Some scholars go further, arguing that formal
equality imposed a symbolic notion of “equality” that makes it difficult to
achieve structural reforms that could be far more effective in improving
the condition of women.111 The marriage equation framework helps make
the contours and limits of this reform clear. The constitutional decisions of
the 1970s changed the marriage equation by requiring that legislatures
strip sex-based classifications from the law. But they did not change the
substantive marriage law and they had only a limited effect on gender
norms. As discussed more fully below, the modified marriage equation left
by these decisions, which persists to this day, does not actually encourage
106. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (“[A]ny statutory scheme which
draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily commands ‘dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,’ and
therefore involves the ‘very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] . . . .’”
(emphasis and omissions in original) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77, 76 (1971))).
107. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975); see also, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S.
76, 89 (1979) (holding laws based merely on the “presum[ption] the father has the ‘primary
responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ while the mother is the ‘center of home and family
life’” unconstitutional (citations omitted)).
108. The Court’s unwillingness to recognize disparate impact as a potential ground for liability
under the Equal Protection Clause largely foreclosed constitutional challenges to sex-neutral policies,
such as employment preferences for veterans, that disproportionately benefit men. See Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
109. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 1395–99 (describing shift in litigation away from articulating
issues related to abortion on equality grounds in response to advocacy against the ERA); Franklin,
supra note 91, at 140–41 (similar); see also Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment
Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223 (2009) (discussing how
substantive understandings of the ERA evolved).
110. See, e.g., Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal
Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 216, 230–33 (Earl M. Maltz
ed., 2003); Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 21 (characterizing both liberal and dominance feminist approaches to legal changes as
“empty at their core” because they “offer[] no values inconsistent with patriarchal values”).
111. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
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couples to share equally domestic and income-producing responsibilities.
Rather, the equation changed from one in which sex-based classifications,
gender norms, and marriage law collectively required men to provide
support and women to provide caretaking to one which in many respects
still encourages specialization but is formally agnostic regarding which
spouse plays which role.
B. The Gender of Marriage Law
The body of Supreme Court decisions issued in the 1970s that held sexbased classifications in family law and related benefits law to be
unconstitutional was a significant development in sex discrimination law.
The Court held, for the first time, that sex-based classifications in the law
could not be justified simply on the grounds that they promoted, or
reasonably responded to the prevalence of, the traditional division of
responsibility between husbands and wives. The stereotyping theory that
the Court adopted in these cases continues to have significant import
today.112
But the decisions have a separate legacy that is far less considered.113
By simply requiring formal equality, the Court left in place an architecture
of marriage and related benefits laws that, while no longer sex-specific,
nevertheless continues to encourage couples to specialize into
breadwinning and caretaking roles. I call these incentives to specialize the
“gender” of marriage law. Consider, for example, Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld.114 In Weinberger, the Court held unconstitutional a provision
in social security law that provided benefits for mothers with minor
children whose wage-earning husbands had died but did not provide
comparable benefits for fathers with minor children whose wage-earning
wife had died.115 In accordance with the decision in Weinberger, this and
numerous other provisions of social security law were expanded to cover
fathers as well as mothers, husbands as well as wives. But the substance of
social security dependent benefits, structured originally to meet the needs

112. See generally Franklin, supra note 91 (discussing historical context for anti-stereotyping
theory and its contemporary relevance).
113. Nancy Polikoff is an important exception. She has carefully catalogued many of the ways in
which marriage law encourages spousal specialization and this informs her skepticism regarding the
normative attractiveness of marriage as an objective for gay and lesbian couples. See generally
POLIKOFF, supra note 17.
114. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
115. Id.
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of a family with a breadwinning husband and a caretaking wife, was not
changed.116
Social security permits a dependent spouse to collect 50 percent of the
benefits earned by a breadwinning spouse when the dependent spouse
reaches retirement age, in addition to the benefits collected by the
breadwinning spouse.117 A dependent spouse may also receive benefits to
support herself or himself118 and/or dependent children119 upon the death
of a wage-earning spouse. These benefits are also available to divorced
spouses if the marriage has lasted at least ten years.120 In other words, even
if a dependent spouse has not engaged in paid work (and thus has not paid
into the social security system at all), she or he is entitled to significant
benefits based on her or his spouse’s contributions. Although the policy is
now formally sex-neutral, almost all of the beneficiaries are couples in
which the husband dramatically out-earned the wife; a recent study found
that 99% of claimants of spousal benefits are women.121 Couples in which
both spouses earn relatively similar incomes generally do not benefit from
these provisions because each individual’s own benefit rate is higher than
the dependent benefits they could collect. Social security thus subsidizes
specialization by spouses into breadwinning and caregiving roles and
spreads the risk associated with such specialization across the wageearning, social-security-tax-paying workforce. In a somewhat stylized but
still illuminating example, a married couple in which one spouse earns
twice the national average wage and the other spouse does not engage in
paid work collectively receives $100,000 more in social security benefits
over a typical lifetime than a married couple in which each spouse earns
the national average wage.122 Efforts to “update” the law to better protect

116. Phyllis Schlafly used the possibility that these spousal benefits would be eliminated as one of
her prominent arguments against the ERA. See ERA Will Take Away Social Security Rights of Wives
and Widows, EAGLE FORUM, http://www.eagleforum.org/era/flyer/ERA-07.pdf.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2006) (wives’ benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (2006) (husbands’
benefits).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2006) (widows’ benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (2006) (widowers’
benefits).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (2006) (mothers’ and fathers’ benefits).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (d), (e) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 416(d) (2006) (defining divorced
spouses).
121. See Theodore F. Figinski, Women and the Social Security Earnings Test, 1 n.2 (Mar. 31,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1821290. The extraordinarily
lopsided sex-allocation is undoubtedly in part because the benefits are available to retired workers and
thus reflect a more traditional allocation of wage earning than will be true in the future as younger
couples, including a greater percentage where wives significantly out-earn husbands, reach retirement
age.
122. Eugene Steuerle et al., Does Social Security Treat Spouses Fairly?, URBAN INS. (Nov. 30,
1999), http://www.urban.org/publications/309257.html. These rules also mean that a married couple
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couples who share wage-earning responsibilities more equally have been
consistently unsuccessful.123
Federal tax law, likewise, encourages such specialization. It imposes a
“marriage penalty” on many married couples who earn relatively
comparable amounts—those couples pay more than they would pay
collectively if they were able to file individual returns—and provides a
“marriage bonus” for couples with a significant disparity in earnings.124
Because of marital joint returns, the earnings of a “secondary” wage earner
are taxed at higher rates than they otherwise would be.125 Additionally, if
both members of the couple work outside the home, they pay taxes on the
income they earn, including income used to purchase childcare services
(other than a limited credit or set-aside) or assistance with housework.126
By contrast, if one member of the couple stays home and provides
childcare or housework services herself or himself, the couple pays no tax
on the imputed value of such services, further increasing the marriage
“bonus” for couples with such specialization.127 Additionally, employers
often make health insurance available to an employee and her or his
spouse and dependents. This benefit, when used by married couples, is not
taxed; even if employers offer such benefits to partners of gay and lesbian

with a single wage earner receives far more in collective benefits than a wage earner who makes the
same salary as the breadwinner but is not married.
123. See generally Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal
Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1.
124. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have to
Do with Joint Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 719–20 (2011). Statutes enacted in 2001 and 2003 largely
removed the marriage penalty for taxpayers in the lower tax brackets, but penalties remain for higherincome families. These changes actually increased the marriage bonus for many families with a single
primary wage earner. Although they were politically popular, the future of these reforms is in question
as they are set to expire along with other Bush-era tax changes. See id. For other discussions of the
effects of marriage penalties and bonuses, see, for example, EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN
12–19 (1997); McMahon, supra at 720 n.10 (citing a number of relevant sources); Shari Motro, A New
“I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1560–68 (2006).
125. Scholars have long critiqued this as discouraging employment by women. See McMahon,
supra note 124, at 720 n.10.
126. An individual or a couple who purchases childcare for work-related needs generally may
elect to receive a tax credit for a portion of childcare expenses or to set aside up to $5000 of pre-tax
income to purchase childcare services. See IRS PUB. NO. 503, CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE
EXPENSES 9 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p503.pdf. The expense of full-time
child care often far exceeds these potential tax savings. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CHILD CARE RES. &
REFERRAL AGENCIES, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE: 2011 UPDATE 7, available at
http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/files/default_site_pages/2011/cost_report_2011_full_report_0.pdf
(“The average cost of full-time child care for an infant in a center in 2010 ranged from $4,650 in
Mississippi to more than $18,200 in the District of Columbia” and the comparable average annual cost
for a four-year-old child ranged from “$3900 in Mississippi to $14,5000 in the District of Columbia”).
127. See Lily Kahng, One is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 662 (2010).
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employees (or domestic partners of unmarried heterosexual employees),
the employees must pay a tax on the value of the policy.128
Although having one spouse opt out of the paid labor market is often
conceived of as a “luxury” for the middle- or upper-class, two of the most
significant government assistance programs for low-income families also
encourage, or at least permit, a breadwinner-caretaker divide for married
couples. In 1996, welfare was dramatically reformed to move recipients
from “welfare to work.” Supporters of the legislation justified work
requirements by pointing to the statistics, discussed in Part II.C, showing
dramatic increases in the number of mothers in the paid work force and
arguing that poor women receiving government support should likewise be
required to work outside the home. But as Noah Zatz has demonstrated,
the federal legislation actually imposes hourly work requirements on
families collectively. In single-parent families, the parent (usually a
mother) must work to receive benefits, but two-parent families can receive
benefits so long as either parent, or the two parents together, meets slightly
higher hour requirements.129 Similarly, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) determines eligibility for benefits on the basis of household
earnings, with identical or almost identical standards applying for singleparent households and dual-parent households.130 Under both programs,
since the value of childcare provided by a parent is not imputed as income,
it will often make sense for one parent to provide childcare and the other
to perform the paid work.131 This is all the more true since earned income
by both parents could easily push even a quite poor family over the

128. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, UNEQUAL TAXES ON EQUAL BENEFITS: THE TAXATION OF
DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS 1, 4 (2007), http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/
18040.pdf. This is true even if they are married under state law, because federal tax law does not
recognize the marriage. See id.
129. See Noah D. Zatz, Revisiting the Class-Parity Analysis of Welfare Work Requirements, 83
SOC. SERV. REV. 313, 322 (2009). The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
requires a single parent to work (or participate in other qualifying activities, which include some
education and training programs) at least thirty hours per week, although some exceptions apply to
parents with children under the age of six. Id. at 317. Two-parent families must work collectively at
least thirty-five hours per week (far less than the sixty hours per week that would be the equivalent of
simply twice the single-parent requirement). Id. at 322. The majority of states permit the two-parent
work requirement to be satisfied by either parent or by the parents collectively; a few encourage or
require that they be satisfied by a single breadwinner. See id. at 326–27. By contrast, a significant
minority of states require both parents to do at least some work and some further require an equal
division. See id.
130. See Gregory Acs & Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict Between
Marriage Promotion Initiatives for Cohabiting Couples with Children and Marriage Penalties in Tax
and Transfer Programs, in NEW FEDERALISM: NAT’L SURVEY OF AM.’S FAMILIES, at 2 (Urban Inst.
Ser. No. B-66) (Apr. 2005); Zatz, supra note 129, at 328.
131. Cf. Zatz, supra note 129, at 341.
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eligibility threshold. Indeed, although the EITC has been shown to
increase single mothers’ employment, it seems to decrease married
mothers’ employment.132
For many couples, an extra wage more than compensates for the tax,
social security, welfare, or EITC benefits described above. Nonetheless, at
least for couples in which one spouse’s earning potential far exceeds the
other spouse’s, or where the cost of paying for childcare (or elder care)
and other domestic services is close to the wages that one spouse would
earn, such provisions can encourage couples to specialize in breadwinning
and caregiving roles.133
The incentives embodied in these government programs are
complemented by societal and personal understandings of marriage that
likewise encourage many couples to specialize. A decision to marry is a
statement from each member of the couple that they intend to remain in
the relationship, ideally for life. Marriage naturally encourages a shift from
an individualized focus to a family-based focus for decision-making.
Members of a family develop interdependencies. They can take advantage
of individual skills and aptitudes and reap gains from specialization. They
can subordinate immediate interests of one or both members of the couple
for expected collective long-term gain. There is nothing inherently
gendered in dividing responsibilities with a spouse in a complementary
fashion, but as discussed more fully below, in the vast majority of
different-sex couples, women take on greater responsibility for nonincome producing domestic work and men for income-producing work.134
The gendered architecture of marriage law also persists in the
protections that state laws provide to a dependent spouse if the relationship
comes to an end. First, marriage law makes it hard to exit a relationship. A
court must adjudicate a divorce or approve a settlement. In most states, a
court has the power to award a share of property acquired during a
marriage, regardless of title.135 Courts are generally instructed to
“equitably divide” such property; a typical statute requires consideration
of factors such as the extent to which one spouse has provided care for
children or has facilitated the other spouse’s wage-earning, as well as the

132. Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of
Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1931, 1932 (2004).
133. My thanks to Stephanie McMahon for helping me to clarify this point.
134. See infra Part II.C.
135. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3501 (West 2010) (allowing for the division of marital
property upon divorce); Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958–
2008, 42 FAM. L. Q. 419, 427–29 (2008) (discussing emergence of equitable distribution).
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relative ability of the spouses to support themselves.136 Courts are also
empowered, at least in certain circumstances, to order a wage-earning
spouse to make maintenance or alimony payments to a dependent spouse
even after a marriage has ended.137 Even though the vast majority of
divorces are resolved through private negotiations, dependent spouses
negotiating in the “shadow of the law” can use these substantive
entitlements to strengthen their position.138
As discussed more fully below, contemporary marriage law is far from
sufficient to protect fully a dependent spouse’s financial standing after
divorce.139 But the law provides considerably greater recourse to a
dependent spouse than to a similarly situated person cohabiting with a
partner. Marriage law establishes as a default an expectation that property
accumulated and income earned during the marriage will be shared, and it
empowers courts to effectuate such divisions.140 By contrast, no court
needs to be involved when a cohabiting relationship ends, and (if courts do
become involved) the legal default is that individual members of the
couple leave the relationship with the income each earned and any
property such income was used to acquire. In other words, a dependent
cohabitor who drops out of the workplace to provide domestic support
might well have no claim to property or income accumulated by her
partner.141 Even if a dependent cohabitor has the foresight, resources, and

136. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3502(a) (West 2010) (factors considered in equitable
distribution include the contribution by one party to the increased earning power of the other,
including contributions as a homemaker; the amount and sources of income of each party; and the
opportunity for future income). Equitable distribution statutes also however typically consider the
extent to which each party contributed to the acquisition or appreciation of marital property, a factor
that can favor the breadwinning spouse. See id.
137. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3701 (West 2010) (allowing courts to award alimony).
Pennsylvania still permits courts to award open-ended alimony. See id. § 3701(c). Many other states
now generally permit only short-term awards designed to permit a dependent spouse to become selfsufficient. See infra text accompanying note 213.
138. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
139. See infra Part II.D.
140. Through prenuptial and other contractual agreements, married couples may depart from these
defaults, but courts typically review such contracts for procedural and, in many states, substantive
fairness. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 351–52 (N.H. 2003) (describing heightened
scrutiny applied to prenuptial agreements).
141. If the couple has children in common, and if the dependent cohabitor maintained custody of
the children after dissolution of the relationship, she or he would have a claim for child support.
Additionally, some states recognize implicit contracts or equitable principles such as unjust enrichment
as grounds for allocating a share of income to the dependent cohabitor. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin,
134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 829–30 (Ct. App. 1976); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330–31 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980). There is little empirical research on the economic effects of ending a cohabitation, but one
study found that female cohabitors’ standard of living drops far more dramatically than male
cohabitors’ standard of living when the relationship ends. See Sarah Avellar & Pamela Smock, The
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bargaining power to contract explicitly with a partner for financial
recompense if the relationship unravels, she or he may still have no legal
recourse because courts in some states refuse to enforce even express
contracts between cohabitors.142
The law makes similar distinctions between married and unmarried
individuals upon death. If a married individual dies without a will,
intestacy laws typically provide that at least half, and in some states and
under some circumstances, all, of an estate passes to a spouse. If a married
individual dies with a will, state laws typically provide that, regardless of
the will’s terms, a spouse has a right to elect to receive between one third
and one half of the estate.143 Federal tax law permits property to pass to a
surviving spouse tax-free.144 By contrast, if a cohabiting partner dies
intestate, his or her property will pass to his or her children, parents,
siblings, or other family members, or simply revert to the state, rather than
to the partner.145 Even if an individual has left property to a cohabiting
partner in a will, the partner will often need to pay taxes that a spouse
would be excused from paying.
Employment law also retains a significantly “gendered” architecture. A
comprehensive discussion of employment law is beyond the scope of this
Article, but as described in Part I.B, employment law, like family law,
once used sex-based classifications to enforce the separate spheres
ideology. Most explicit distinctions on the basis of sex were made illegal
by the enactment of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. 146 But, as in family
law, these laws primarily have been held to simply require formal equality,
and thus the norms and substantive law of the workplace, designed around

Economic Consequences of the Dissolution of Cohabiting Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 315, 324
(2005). The drop experienced by female cohabitors was less severe than that experienced by wives
following a divorce, but the researchers attributed this to the fact that married household incomes are
considerably higher on average than cohabiting household incomes. See id. at 323. As the researchers
put it, "relationship dissolution . . . [is] an equalizer among married and cohabiting women. When a
coresidential union ends, women end up in strikingly similar positions; some just fall farther to get
there.” Id. at 325.
142. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
143. For a detailed description of each state’s laws regarding transfer of property upon death, see
Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227.
Rosenbury argues that divorce laws often provide greater protection to a dependent spouse than the
laws governing property distribution at death. See id. at 1260–61, 1273–74.
144. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 950: INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES (Rev. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p950.pdf. Gifts between
spouses are also tax-free. See id.
145. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and
Demographic Status, 2009 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 36, 55, 57–58.
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
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a (male) worker with (female) support at home, remain largely in place.147
The standard in American law is a forty-hour work week that far exceeds
the hours children are in school; mandatory overtime is permitted and
common; and there is no right to take time off to care for a child who
needs to miss a day of school for a routine illness or to go to a doctor.148
The Family and Medical Leave Act provides unpaid leave upon birth or
adoption of a child, and to care for a family member with a serious health
condition,149 but roughly half of American workers do not qualify for
FMLA leave, either because their employer is too small or because they
have not worked a requisite number of hours.150 Many more cannot afford
to take unpaid time off.
Employee benefits in turn facilitate a choice by a married couple to
have one spouse drop out of the paid workforce by providing benefits to a
dependent spouse and children. Employers that provide health care
benefits typically make them available only to employees, their spouses,
and their dependents. Other employer-sponsored benefits, such as pension
rights, likewise are typically made available to an employee and a spouse.
Employers could choose to provide some of these benefits to unmarried
partners of employees, but most use marriage as a bright line test to

147. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 64–113 (2000) (discussing masculine “ideal worker” norm). Title VII also
prohibits facially neutral policies that cause a “disparate impact” on the basis of sex, but courts’
generous interpretation of the “business necessity” defense has limited the utility of these provisions to
challenge non-family-friendly policies. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1226–30 (1989) (discussing difficulty
of overcoming business necessity defense). Joan Williams and Nancy Segal characterize the
limitations of disparate impact liability as “accepted wisdom,” but identify a few cases in which
disparate impact claims have been successful. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 77, 78, 134–38 (2003). More importantly, they also identify several other claims that can be used
to challenge what they call the “maternal wall.” See id. at 122–61 (discussing disparate treatment
theories under Title VII as well as claims under other statutes including the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Equal Pay Act, and state statutes).
148. See, e.g., Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 IND. L.J. 51, 58 (2005) (explaining the
Fair Labor Standards Act “establishes the forty-hour work week as the norm” and “permit[s]
employers to require unlimited overtime hours if they [a]re willing to pay for it”); id. at 61 (citing
study finding one-third of workers who performed overtime were forced by their employer to do so);
U.S. Joint Economic Committee, Expanding Access to Paid Sick Leave: The Impact of the Healthy
Families Act on America’s Workers 2 (2010), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=
Files.Serve&File_id=abf8aca7-6b94-4152-b720-2d8d04b81ed6 (advocating for enactment of
legislation guaranteeing most workers paid sick days and stating that “millions of workers are unable
to miss work without forgoing a paycheck—or risking job loss”).
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006).
150. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the
Department of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 FED. REG. 35550, 35622 (2007) (2005 data
showing 76.1 million of 141.7 million total U.S. employees, or approximately 54%, are eligible).
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determine eligibility, and, as noted above, tax policy and other regulation
encourages this.
Empirical studies have attempted to track the significance of the bundle
of legal rights discussed above on decision-making by different-sex
couples. Studies that compare the labor allocation of married couples to
that of cohabiting couples provide support for the assertion that marriage
encourages specialization. Although researchers disagree as to the
significance of certain subsidiary factors, numerous studies find that
married couples, as compared to cohabiting couples, are more likely to
make long-term cooperative investments in each other and in their
relationships, such as those implicit in specializing into breadwinning and
caregiving roles.151 However, researchers have recognized that with
different-sex couples, the significance of these studies may be limited by
concerns that they reflect a “selection bias”: different-sex couples who
choose long-term cohabitation rather than marriage may have a
predilection for greater individual autonomy.152 As discussed more fully in
Part III, same-sex couples offer an exciting research possibility precisely
because state variation among the possibility of couples’ marrying helps
control for this selection bias (albeit in a way that I think unfairly
compromises individuals’ civil rights).
More generally, it is difficult to determine how much work legal
incentives, relative to gender norms, play in couples’ decisions to
specialize; again, as discussed below, one key benefit of the marriage
equation framework is that it can help disaggregate these effects. That
said, it seems clear that legal rights do play a role in many decisions made
by couples. Since individual health insurance plans are often prohibitively
expensive, access to employer-sponsored health care benefits through
marriage can be a key factor in permitting one adult in a family to stay
home. While few couples choose whether to marry purely based on tax
planning, the potential marriage benefits and penalties are widely

151. See, e.g., Niko Matouschek & Imram Rasul, The Economics of the Marriage Contract:
Theories and Evidence, 51 J.L. & ECON. 59 (2008); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marital Commitment and the
Legal Regulation of Divorce, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 35 (Antony
W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002); see also, e.g., Jeanne A. Batalova & Philip N. Cohen,
Premarital Cohabitation and Housework: Couples in Cross-National Perspective, 64 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 743 (2002) (comparing division of labor among cohabiting couples in twenty-two countries);
Teresa Ciabattari, Cohabitation and Housework: The Effects of Marital Intentions, 66 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 118 (2004) (analyzing effect of marital intentions among cohabitors on division of housework).
152. See, e.g., Julie Brines & Kara Joyner, The Ties that Bind: Principles of Cohesion in
Cohabitation and Marriage, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 333 (1999).
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discussed.153 So are the potential trade-offs between paying for childcare
to earn a second (taxable) income versus the (nontaxable imputed value
of) staying home.154 Basic retirement planning typically helps couples
understand social security spousal benefits, as well as ways in which some
couples with disparate earnings may maximize benefits by receiving
sequentially both spousal benefits and primary benefits.155 Even legal
rights that one might assume were much less well known have been shown
to have an effect on decision-making. For example, several studies have
found that couples have sufficient awareness of divorce law such that
changes in the substantive law—such as greater or lesser protections for a
dependent spouse—affects bargaining between spouses and the
willingness to invest in marriage-specific capital during the marriage
itself.156
In fact, to the extent that individuals make assumptions about legal
rights associated with marriage, they may well assume that the law
provides more protection to dependent spouses than it actually does—and
thus these misconceptions might “over-push” couples to specialize. For
example, practitioners report that despite reforms to alimony made more
than a generation ago, it is still quite common for individuals to believe
that all women (and only women) receive alimony upon divorce.157 In

153. See, e.g., Donald E. Hodson, Marriage Tax Penalty, HITCHED, http://www.hitchedmag.com/
article.php?id=508 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“[I]f you both earn enough to be taxed at 25% . . . you
suffer a ‘penalty.’ . . . The flip side to the marriage penalty is the marriage tax bonus. You are eligible
for the tax bonus when only one of you is employed.”); William Perez, Getting Married and Taxes,
ABOUT.COM, http://taxes.about.com/od/taxplanning/qt/marriage_tax.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)
(“Strictly from a tax perspective, getting married makes the most sense when one spouse earns income
and the other spouse doesn’t earn income. . . . [And] staying single makes the most sense when both
life-partners earn income.”).
154. See, e.g., Alan Marc Feigenbaum, Keep Working or Stay at Home with the Kids?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/07/cut_an_income.asp#axzz1
ZAoDa2vH.
155. See, e.g., Jonathan Pond, 4 Tips for Boosting Your Social Security Benefits, AARP (Aug. 13,
2010), http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-08-2010/4-Tips-for-Boosting-Your-Social-SecurityBenefits.html?CMP=KNC-360I-GOOGLE-WOR-SOC&HBX_PK=spousal_benefit&utm_source=Goo
gle&utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=spousal%2Bbenefit&utm_campaign=G_Work&360cid=SI_1626099
01_6446871421_1; Dana Anspach, Key Things to Know about the Social Security Spouse Benefit,
ABOUT.COM, http://moneyover55.about.com/od/socialsecuritybenefits/a/socialsecurityspousebenefit
.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
156. See, e.g., Betsey Stevenson, The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital, 25 J.
LAB. ECON. 75 (2007) (collecting and reviewing studies).
157. Practitioners, both supportive and opposed to generous alimony provisions, identify these as
common misconceptions. See, e.g., Patricia M. Barbarito, Is It True That You Are Automatically
Entitled to Receive Alimony for a Percentage of the Number of Years You Were Married?, DIVORCE
MAGAZINE.COM, http://www.divorcemag.com/NJ/faq/legalbarbarito.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)
(“Clients have told me (with great conviction) over the years that: only men pay alimony (a myth); all
women are entitled to alimony (also a myth); and a cheating spouse always pays alimony (to the great
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reality, only about 15 percent of divorces include alimony or maintenance
awards; moreover, these are often for only relatively short periods of time
and are frequently difficult to enforce.158
There are some compelling reasons why marriage and related benefits
law should offer protection to dependent spouses who subordinate, or
forego entirely, their earning potential to meet domestic responsibilities.
My point here is simply to note that in myriad ways, the law of marriage—
although now sex-neutral—continues to encourage spouses to specialize
into breadwinning and caretaking roles. And, as the next subpart details,
most different-sex couples who choose to specialize do so along
traditional gendered lines.
C. A Stalled Revolution
The separate spheres ideology characterized women’s place as in the
home and men’s as in the workplace. As described in Part II.A above,
during the 1960s and 1970s, the sex-specific aspects of family law that
enforced these roles were held to be unconstitutional, and new laws were
enacted that outlawed sex discrimination in employment. Subsequent to
these changes, there has been a dramatic growth in women’s employment.
Women now typically share breadwinning responsibility. In 1960, only
27% of married women with children under eighteen participated in the
paid labor force;159 by 1970, that figure had already climbed to almost
40%;160 and by 2008, it was just under 70%.161 In 1970, working wives
disappointment of many, not true!).”); Common Misconceptions About Family Law, ILLINOIS LEGAL
AID, http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.printvideotranscript&webcastxmlfile
=archive3407.xml&contentID=3407 (last updated Nov. 2004) (“A lot of people believe that women
will always get maintenance or always get alimony . . . or [will say] I’m a man [so] I can’t get alimony
or maintenance.”); Aaron Dishon, Spousal Support FAQ, END SPOUSAL SUPPORT, http://www.
endspousalsupport.com/spousal-support-faq (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“Q[uestion]: Do all divorces
or separations involve spousal support? [Answer]: No, this is a common misconception.”).
158. See, e.g., Constance L. Shehan et al., Alimony: An Anomaly in Family Social Science, 51
FAM. REL. 308, 308, 310, 312 (2002). See also infra Part II.D (discussing contemporary alimony
policy and practice).
159. TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM, TRANSIT MARKETS OF THE FUTURE: THE
CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 76 (1998) (“In 1986, more than 61 percent of married women with children
under 18 worked outside the home—compared with only 27 percent in 1960.”); see also KARINE MOE
& DIANNA SHANDY, GLASS CEILINGS & 100-HOUR COUPLES: WHAT THE OPT-OUT PHENOMENON
CAN TEACH US ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY 16 fig.2 (2010) (graph showing in 1960 approximately
27% of married women with children were in labor force).
160. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 380
tbl.580 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/labor.pdf (39.7% of all
married women with children were in labor force in 1970).
161. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 15 tbl.6
(2009) [hereinafter DATABOOK 2009], available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf.
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contributed 27% of their families’ total incomes; by 2007, that figure had
risen to 36%.162 More strikingly, in 2007, 26% of wives earned more than
their husbands.163 The recession of 2008–2009 compounded this trend, as
more men than women lost jobs.164
Although married women’s participation in the labor force has
increased markedly, they still perform far more housework than married
men. In 1965, married women spent about seven times as many hours as
their husbands on housework; now married women spend about twice as
much time as their husbands on housework.165 A significant gap exists
even when both spouses have paid employment. For example, recent
studies assert that when both spouses work full-time, the wife still
typically does twenty-eight hours of housework while the husband does
just over sixteen hours per week.166 The kind of housework varies as well;
women more typically do the cleaning, cooking, and laundry while men
more typically do more sporadic jobs such as house maintenance and lawn
mowing.167 Thus, women perform more domestic work and the work that
they do has less flexibility in terms of scheduling. Women working full
time also still generally do more childcare than their husbands, although
some recent studies suggest that this imbalance is narrowing considerably,
The rise in married mothers’ labor participation, combined with a rise in single-parent headed families,
means that only one in five families consists of the traditional male breadwinner, female homemaker
structure. See Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of
Families—2010 tbl.2 (Mar. 24, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf.
162. DATABOOK 2009, supra note 161, at 2. Other estimates are even higher. See, e.g., Heather
Boushey, The New Breadwinners, in THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES
EVERYTHING 31, 36 (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/
a_womans_nation.pdf (married mothers contribute on average 42.2% of families’ total incomes).
163. DATABOOK 2009, supra note 161, at 2. Because of the significant number of households
headed by a single parent, nearly 40% of mothers are the primary breadwinners for their families.
Boushey, supra note 162, at 32.
164. Id. at 33 (men accounted for three out of every four jobs lost in the recession).
165. See Suzanne M. Bianchi & Sara B. Raley, Time Allocation in Families, in WORK, FAMILY,
HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING 19, 30 tbl.2.5 (Bianchi et al. eds., 2005); see also Mylène Lachance-Grzela
& Geneviève Bouchard, Why Do Women Do the Lion’s Share of Housework? A Decade of Research,
63 SEX ROLES 767, 768 (2010) (collecting studies).
166. Michael Kimmel, Has a Man’s World Become a Woman’s Nation?, in THE SHRIVER
REPORT, A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 323, 348, available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf (citing Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad
Share it All, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15, 2008, at 47); see also, e.g., Sharon Bartley et al., Husbands
and Wives in Dual-Earner Marriages: Decision-Making, Gender Role Attitudes, Division of
Household Labor, and Equity, 37 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 69, 87 (2005) (“[H]usbands and wives in
these dual-earner families appear to divide tasks along traditional gendered lines. . . . Husbands
performed an average of 20+ hours of household labor per week, whereas wives performed an average
of 34 hours of household labor per week.”).
167. See Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 566 tbl.1.
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particularly among younger men.168 Working women are also more likely
than their working husbands to take on responsibility for care of elderly
family members.169 These factors collectively give rise to the reality that
Arlie Hochschild famously described as the “second shift.”170 Women
work significant hours outside the home and then return to significant
childcare and housework responsibilities at home. It is important to note,
however, that men tend to spend more hours in their paid employment, so
some studies suggest that on average the total number of hours “worked”
by each spouse may be close to equivalent.171
Labor force participation and housework division are only part of the
story. Working mothers are far more likely than working fathers to miss
work for children’s illnesses or when childcare arrangements break
down.172 Working mothers are also far more likely than fathers to forego
or transition out of time-intensive or travel-intensive careers when children
are born.173 They are more likely to quit when required to work extensive
overtime and/or when their spouses are required to work extensive
overtime.174 Women are also far more likely than men to work parttime;175 this is particularly common for married mothers.176

168. See, e.g., Kimmel, supra note 166, at 350–51 (reporting that men on average spend 3 hours a
day on work days with children under the age of thirteen and women on average spend 3.8 hours); see
also generally KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: HOW A NEW GENERATION IS
RESHAPING FAMILY, WORK, AND GENDER IN AMERICA (2010) (discussing widely shared aspirations
among younger Americans to share work and domestic responsibilities more equally, but also
documenting tensions and resistance); cf. SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 69 tbl.4.2 (2006) (reporting based on data from 2000 that married mothers
spend almost 19 hours per week in primary and secondary care and that married fathers spend almost
nine).
169. See, e.g., RICHARD W. JOHNSON & ANTHONY T. LO SASSO, THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN
HOURS OF PAID EMPLOYMENT AND TIME ASSISTANCE TO ELDERLY PARENTS AT MIDLIFE 20, 33 tbl.1,
34 tbl.2 (2000), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/elderly_parents.pdf (finding 25.5%
of women and 13.6% of men in paid employment provided significant time help to elderly parents or
parents-in-law).
170. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND
THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
171. See, e.g., BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 168, at 115.
172. See, e.g., MOE & SHANDY, supra note 159 at 63 (citing a study finding that two-thirds of
“highly educated, employed” women report taking time off to take a child to a doctor while only 7% of
their husbands had).
173. See id. at 52–58.
174. Youngjoo Cha, Reinforcing Separate Spheres: The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s and
Women’s Employment in Dual-Earner Households, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 303, 313–26 (2010); see also
generally MOE & SHANDY, supra note 159 (describing phenomenon they dub the “100-hour couple”
where extensive overtime demands on both members of a couple lead to the wife dropping out of the
labor force).
175. DATABOOK 2009, supra note 161, at 70–72 tbl.20 (24.6% of employed women usually
worked part-time compared with 11.1% of employed men in 2008).
176. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 159, at 62.
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In the United States, a significant gender gap in the allocation of
domestic responsibilities within marriage exists across racial-ethnic
categories. However, the size of the gap varies by racial-ethnic categories,
with black married couples typically displaying the least inequality. For
example, one recent study looking at the gap in “core housework” found it
ranged from 5.54 for Hispanic couples (that is, that Hispanic wives did 5and-half times more “core housework” than their husbands), to 4.12 for
Asian couples, 3.16 for white couples, and “only” 2.79 for black
couples.177 Researchers surmise that the relatively greater equality in black
couples likely reflects the greater earning power of black women relative
to black men, racial-ethnic differences in “doing gender,” or the
prevalence of egalitarian norms.178 For all racial and ethnic groups, class
may likewise be a significant variable, as several studies have found that
as women’s absolute earning power increases they may “out-source”
greater amounts of domestic work thus reducing the disparity between
husbands and wives (albeit to a domestic workforce that is overwhelming
female, and also disproportionately minority).179 The availability of free
childcare from extended family (e.g., a grandmother who cares for
children while parents work) may also vary according to class, race, and
ethnicity, and may likewise play a key role in how couples allocate
domestic responsibilities.180
Since law no longer mandates that men and women play distinct roles
within marriage, social scientists have tried to measure and explain drivers
of this persistent gender imbalance. One prominent theory, initially
propounded by Gary Becker, focuses on the efficiencies provided by
specialization. Becker argued that households, like companies, benefit
from a certain level of specialization.181 Both work in the paid workforce
and work inside the home require skills that can be developed through
experience, and the family unit will benefit collectively if one member of
the household develops expertise in the former and a separate member of
177. Liana C. Sayer & Leigh Fine, Racial-Ethnic Differences in U.S. Married Women’s and
Men’s Housework, 101 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 259, 262 tbl.1 (2011).
178. See id. at 262–64; Daphne John & Beth Anne Shelton, The Production of Gender Among
Black and White Women and Men: The Case of Household Labor, 36 SEX ROLES 171, 188–90 (1997);
Terri L. Orbuch & Sandra L. Eyster, Division of Household Labor Among Black Couples and White
Couples, 76 SOC. FORCES 301, 325–26 (1997).
179. See, e.g., Sanjiv Gupta, Her Money, Her Time: Women’s Earnings and Their Housework
Hours, 35 SOC. SCI. RES. 975, 995–96 (2006); Jan Paul Heisig, Who Does More Housework: Rich or
Poor? A Comparison of 33 Countries, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 74 (2011).
180. My thanks to Kimberly Richman for making this point.
181. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30–53 (enlarged ed. 1991).
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the household develops expertise in the latter.182 Conversely, significant
domestic responsibilities take energy and time away from paid
employment and can therefore reduce success in that sphere.183 Marriage
law offers (limited) protection to the dependent spouse against
abandonment by the provider spouse.184 Becker initially suggested that
women were innately better suited to take on responsibilities for childcare
and for housework due to the biological realities of pregnancy, childbirth,
and breastfeeding, and that (different-sex) marriages were a societal
solution to bring together the “complementarity” of male and female skills
into an efficient familial unit.185 In later work, he backed somewhat away
from this conclusion to suggest that wage discrimination and other factors,
rather than simply “innate” differences, could play a significant role in
pushing women to specialize in unpaid work.186 Nonetheless, his basic
premise—that it was maximally efficient for the woman to specialize in
domestic work and the man to specialize in breadwinning—remained
unchanged. These ideas retain currency. In 2003, New York Times writer
Lisa Belkin popularized the concept of an “opt-out revolution” of highly
educated women rejecting lucrative and often prestigious employment in
favor of domestic responsibilities and the collective good of their family
units.187 The scope of this “revolution,” as well as the extent to which it is
dictated by inflexible work/family policies, has been hotly contested.188
In fact, as women entered the paid marketplace in increasing numbers,
the basic premises of specialization were arguably undermined. If both
men and women were spending significant hours performing paid work,
why did women still tend to do the bulk of the housework and caregiving
responsibilities? Economists and other social scientists developed a group

182. Id.
183. Id. See also Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the American Time
Use Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159 (2009) (demonstrating that housework has a negative
relation with wages for both women and men).
184. BECKER, supra note 181, at 30.
185. Id. at 37–38.
186. Id. at 54–79. For a recent critique of specialization in the context of family law, see Katharine
K. Baker, Supporting Children, Balancing Lives, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 359 (2006).
187. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, http://www.ny
times.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all.
188. See, e.g., Heather Boushey, “Opting Out?” The Effect of Children on Women’s Employment
in the United States, FEMINIST ECON., Jan. 2008, at 1 (concluding that there is little empirical support
for claims of a widespread opt-out phenomena); Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution that
Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 1
(similar); JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., “OPT-OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS
WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT (2006), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut
.pdf (analyzing data and the extent to which inflexible policies contribute to women dropping out of
the workplace).
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of theories stemming from economic exchange principles to help explain
this phenomenon. These begin with the premise that housework is
unpleasant and that, even within a marriage, individuals will bargain with
their spouses to do less of it if they can.189 Therefore, an individual who
earns more than his spouse will bargain to do less housework, using his
extra earning power as the leverage in the implicit or explicit deal-making.
Unlike Becker’s specialization theories, these exchange theories are
typically presented as sex-neutral. Whichever member of the couple earns
more should be able to use this leverage to perform less housework.
In general, men are more likely to have the power in the relationship to
“bargain out” of housework because they earn more on average than
women. Despite guarantees of equal treatment in employment law, a
significant wage gap between men and women persists. Women who work
full-time earn only about 80 percent of what men who work full-time
do.190 When the comparison includes women who work part-time and/or
part-year the wage gap widens considerably: a study of workers in their
prime earning years found that women earn just thirty-eight cents for
every dollar men earn.191 And women tend to marry men a little older than
they.192 This means that when children are born, men tend to be further
along in their careers and thus earning more than their wives; accordingly,
if one member of the family is going to curtail work to take on additional
domestic responsibilities, it generally makes “sense” for it to be the
woman.193 A similar theory focuses on time allocation, suggesting that the
spouse that spends less time in the paid workforce (again, in most families,
the woman) will typically perform a greater percentage of the housework;
often this will correlate with the economic exchange theory, but not
always.194
But even controlling for such realities, which themselves owe much to
the historic separate spheres ideology, economic theories do not
189. See, e.g., Sarah Thebaud, Masculinity, Bargaining, and Breadwinning: Understanding Men’s
Housework in the Cultural Context of Paid Work, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 330, 332 (2010) (describing
these economic exchange based theories).
190. There are numerous explanations for this wage gap. See generally Michael Selmi, Family
Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 714–44 (2000) (collecting and discussing
studies exploring various theories, including human capital factors, individual choice, and statistical
discrimination). Marriage tends to enhance men’s salaries while it has “a neutral or modestly negative
effect” on women’s. See id. at 726.
191. Heidi Hartmann et al., How Much Progress in Closing the Long-Term Earnings Gap?, in
THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER? 125, 131 (Francine D. Blau et al. eds., 2006).
192. See RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING
POWER 140–42 (1995).
193. See id. at 140–41.
194. See, e.g., Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, supra note 165, at 772 (collecting studies).
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adequately explain the housework imbalance in some families. Women
who earn more than their husbands often still perform a greater share of
the housework than their husbands—and, even more surprising, several
studies have found that as the gap in their earnings widens, the gap in the
housework split also tends to widen.195 In other words, these studies
suggest that a woman who far out-earns her husband will tend to do a
considerably larger share of the housework than a woman who earns about
the same amount as her husband. These findings have led to alternative
theories regarding the division of housework that explicitly focus on
gender norms. Social scientists speculate that couples in which the woman
earns more than the man often “correct” for the “gender deviance” by
embracing a traditional gendered split regarding household
responsibilities.196
Gender based views help shape the division of responsibility regardless
of who earns more. Studies have found that couples who hold strongly
traditional ideas about gender roles—particularly if the male in the couple
does so—are more likely to assign the bulk of housework or child work to
the wife, regardless of the split of income earning.197 Other researchers
have found fathers with “feminist attitudes” perform significantly more
childcare than fathers with more traditional attitudes.198 In short,
traditional expectations regarding appropriate gender roles for men and
women continue to push women to do a greater share of housework and
childcare than pure economic theory would predict. Interestingly, some
research suggests that couples internalize these societal expectations so
significantly that very unequal divisions of responsibilities—and ones that
are clearly not inline with the balanced exchange that economic theory

195. See, e.g., Michael Bittman et al., When Does Gender Trump Money? Bargaining and Time in
Household Work, 109 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 186 (2003); Julie Brines, Economic Dependency, Gender,
and the Division of Labor at Home, 100 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 652 (1994); Theodore N. Greenstein,
Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension,
62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 322 (2000); Thebaud, supra note 189. It may be that this phenomenon is
receding. See Stephanie Coontz, The M.R.S. and the Ph.D., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1
(characterizing these findings as “outdated” and referencing a forthcoming paper by Oriel Sullivan, to
be published by the Council on Contemporary Families, that concludes that the higher a woman’s
educational resources and earning potential relative to her husband, the more help with housework she
gets from her partner).
196. The phrase “gender deviance” is derived from Greenstein, supra note 195, at 332, 325–26,
332–34 (discussing “deviant” gender roles and “deviance neutralization” regarding housework
allocation).
197. See, e.g., Yoav Lavee & Ruth Katz, Division of Labor, Perceived Fairness, and Marital
Quality: The Effect of Gender Ideology, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 27 (2002).
198. See, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Division of Labor Among Lesbian and Heterosexual
Parenting Couples: Correlates of Specialized Versus Shared Patterns, 11 J. ADULT DEV. 179, 180
(2004) (collecting studies).

764

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:721

suggests “should” happen—are nevertheless perceived by both members
of the household as “fair.”199
As discussed above, law no longer mandates separate spheres for men
and women. Therefore, it is common to characterize the pervasiveness and
persistence of gendered divisions of labor as the result of individual
“choices.” This conclusion is arguably false in several respects. First, as
discussed in Part II.B, substantive marriage and benefits law still
encourages specialization. Second, as noted above, both men and women
face significant pressure to conform to traditional gender norms within
their relationship. Third, gender norms may also differentially affect how
employers respond to caretaking obligations by employees. As Joan
Williams and others have demonstrated, employers may assume, for
example, that the mother of a young child would not want a promotion
with significant travel responsibilities, or penalize a male employee who
seeks to play a greater caregiving role than society expects.200 Only
recently have courts begun to recognize such differential treatment by
employers as a form of sex discrimination that may be challenged under
employment discrimination statutes.201 More generally, as discussed
above, existing employment law offers quite limited support for
employees with caretaking responsibilities.202 Thus, a couple who prefers
to share wage-earning and domestic responsibilities relatively equally but
finds this difficult because of inflexible workplace rules may gravitate
towards specialization as a second-best solution.
Whatever the mix of causes, notwithstanding more than thirty years of
sex-neutral family law and employment law, most couples continue to
divide responsibilities along distinctly gendered lines. And, strikingly,
many state that they prefer it. For example, a recent, large-scale survey,
found that a slim majority of Americans stated that they believed that it
was best for society for men to work outside the home and women to
remain home.203 While some studies suggest ongoing movement towards a

199. See, e.g., Michael Braun et al., Perceived Equity in the Gendered Division of Household
Labor, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1145 (2008).
200. See generally Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008) (collecting and discussing recent cases and EEOC guidance recognizing
that employment decisions based on such stereotypes may violate Title VII).
201. See, e.g., id. at 1335–41 (discussing recent cases).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 146–50.
203. John Halpin & Ruy Teixeira, Battle of the Sexes Gives Way to Negotiations, in THE SHRIVER
REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 395, 396, available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf.
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normative preference for sharing responsibilities more equally, others
suggest that this egalitarian preference has leveled off or even receded.204
D. Conflicting Incentives in the Modern Marriage Equation
The marriage equation framework helps organize and analyze the now
conflicting incentives that shape how couples choose to allocate
responsibility for caretaking and breadwinning. The efficacy of policy
design depends on understanding these interactions. A nascent body of
social science research uses cross-national comparisons, reflecting
different policy choices in key aspects of family and employment law, in
conjunction with the kind of “micro” factors discussed above, to better
understand the choices couples make.205 The challenge, however, is
properly identifying, and ideally distilling, the crosscurrents at play.206
Alimony reform can provide a particularly striking example of the way
in which the various factors of the marriage equation interact. Before the
reforms of the 1970s, in many states alimony was sex-specific. It was
available upon divorce to wives, not husbands, and generally limited to
“innocent” wives whose divorces were granted on the basis of a finding
that their husbands were at fault. It continued the sex-specific requirement
that husbands provide support to their wives within marriage—alimony
awards generally continued until either party’s death or until the wife’s
marriage to a new husband who then assumed the support responsibility.207
Importantly, alimony was far from sufficient to protect divorced women’s
interests. It was actually awarded relatively rarely; offered no recourse to a
woman who provided “cause” for the divorce; and often offered
inadequate support even when awarded.208 Certainly, the prior system
needed reform.
In the 1970s, alimony changed in two respects. First, after Orr v.
Orr,209 alimony could no longer be limited to dependent wives; the

204. Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes Toward
Family Issues in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1009,
1014, 1032 (2001).
205. See Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, supra note 165, at 776–77 (collecting studies).
206. Cf. Scott Coltrane, Gender Theory and Household Labor, 63 SEX ROLES 791 (2010) (arguing
that micro- / macro-research needs to better incorporate gender theory).
207. On the history of alimony, see, e.g., Kisthardt, supra note 54.
208. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMANN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 144, 457 (1985) (citing
mid-1970s census reports documenting that 14% of women received alimony); Oldham, supra note
135, at 429 (citing studies reporting alimony, or alimony or property settlement, rates ranging from
9.3% to 25% in various periods during the late nineteenth- to mid-twentieth centuries).
209. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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evolving understanding of equal protection guarantees mandated that it be
made available to dependent spouses of either sex.210 But rather than
simply making alimony sex-neutral, many states followed the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) (originally promulgated in 1970 and
amended in 1971 and 1973) in renaming alimony “maintenance,” and
replacing the traditional understanding of alimony as compensation for
marital fault or an ongoing support obligation with a needs-based
assessment which limited availability of maintenance to spouses unable to
support themselves through employment.211 Maintenance awards are
usually temporary, rather than open-ended, designed simply to permit a
spouse who has not been working to develop employable skills.212 Some
states went even further than the UMDA, adopting statutory time limits on
maintenance for able-bodied spouses except in instances where a child is
significantly disabled or incapacitated, and/or prohibitions against
maintenance awards in relatively short marriages.213 In states that adopted
the UMDA or similar provisions, the focus on demonstrated need means
that maintenance is typically unavailable in divorces where both members
of the couple participated in paid work during the marriage, even if the

210. Id.
211. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347–48 (authorizing awards only
upon a showing that a spouse lacks “sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs” and “is
unable to support himself through employment” or the custodian of a child whose “condition or
circumstances” make it “appropriate” that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside
the home); Uniform Commercial Code Locator, Uniform Matrimonial and Family Laws Locator,
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol9.html#mardv (identifying Arizona, Colorado,
Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington as states that adopted the UMDA).
Other states that are not included on this list adopted provisions that are quite similar to—and
sometimes more restrictive than—the UMDA. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 31-15-7-2 (West 2008)
(basically adopting UMDA standard but adding three year time-limit for many claims); TEX. CODE
ANN. § 8.051 (limiting availability in marriages of less than ten years). Some UMDA states
subsequently amended their statutes to expand grounds that could justify awards of maintenance. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319.A (permitting maintenance upon showing spouse contributed to
educational opportunities of other spouse or in marriage of long duration).
212. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Spousal Support Takes on the Mommy Track: Why the ALI
Proposal is Good for Working Mothers, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 151, 155 (2001) (“Temporary
maintenance awards have become the norm in family law.”); Oldham, supra note 135, at 431 (“[A]
number of empirical studies from the late 1960s through the 1980s confirm the trend of less frequent
awards of spousal support, as well as a growing tendency towards support for a fixed term, as opposed
to support for an indefinite period.”).
213. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 31-15-7-2 (West 2008) (permitting open-ended maintenance to be
awarded only if a spouse is substantially “physically or mentally incapacitated” or a custodian of a
child with a substantial “physical or mental incapacity”; and no more than three years of
“rehabilitative” maintenance to support an able-bodied spouse preparing to reenter or expand paid
labor force participation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051 (generally prohibiting maintenance to ablebodied spouses not caring for a child with a significant disability if the marriage did not exceed ten
years).
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incomes were widely disparate. These reforms fit comfortably with the
1970s feminists’ efforts to remake marriage as a union of “equals,” and to
a larger commitment to challenging so-called benevolent protections
which were, as the Supreme Court observed, “rationalized by an attitude
of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.”214 The reforms accorded with the move towards
no-fault divorce which made it more difficult—and many felt conceptually
troubling—to award alimony as a compensation for spousal misconduct,215
although a significant number of states retained fault as a factor that could
be considered in alimony awards.216 These changes also interacted with a
concurrent shift in most states away from title-based distribution of marital
property, which typically resulted in most marital property being retained
by the wage-earning husband, to equitable distribution.217
If gender roles had been restructured, and if other aspects of
substantive marriage law that encourage specialization during the duration
of the marriage had also been retooled, and particularly if other supports
(such as publicly subsidized childcare, more generous parental leaves, or
greater workplace flexibility) had been established, women might have
begun to participate in paid work on an equal basis with their husbands
and the changes in alimony might have been considered both successful
and fair. But that did not happen. Rather, as discussed above, the modern
marriage equation continues to encourage specialization within marriage,
although it is now formally agnostic regarding which spouse plays which
role. Due to the widespread persistence of gender norms, women continue
to provide the bulk of caregiving within (different-sex) marriages. They
are far more likely than men to drop out of the paid workforce entirely, to
work part-time, or, even if working full-time, to prioritize caretaking over
taking full advantage of their earning power.218 Although equitable
distribution of marital property can partially compensate for such realities,

214. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
215. See, e.g., Kisthardt, supra note 54, at 68 (“With the advent of no-fault divorce, alimony lost
its punitive rationale.”).
216. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 48–51 (research conducted in 1996 concluded that states are divided
approximately evenly on whether fault could be considered in alimony awards). The UMDA explicitly
precludes consideration of fault in maintenance awards. See UMDA, § 308(b) (setting forth factors
that courts should consider in setting a “just [amount] without regard to marital misconduct”).
217. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 427–29 (discussing historical roots of equitable
distribution but observing “it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that a majority of noncommunity
property states enacted equitable distribution statutes or confirmed during that period via judicial
opinion that divorce courts had this power”).
218. See supra Part II.C.
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many divorcing couples have very little marital property; their greatest
asset is often the primary wage earner’s income.219 Additionally, upon
divorce, women are far more likely than men to be granted sole or primary
physical custody of children, and accordingly family responsibilities
continue to compromise their ability to maximize their wage-earning
potential.220 The combined effect of these various factors means that, not
surprisingly, women’s standard of living after divorce often falls
dramatically, while men’s typically declines modestly or even improves.221
Changing one aspect of the marriage equation (sex-based open-ended
alimony eligibility) without changing others (gender norms that expect
women to be primary caretakers and tax, benefit, and other substantive
marriage laws that encourage specialization during marriage) upset the
previous balance. Divorced women, as a group, are probably not worse off
under the current regime than they would have been under the prior
alimony regime.222 But they did not benefit as much as they might have

219. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 433–34 (collecting empirical studies from the 1960s
through 1980s finding many divorcing couples had little property but that trend toward dividing even
unvested pension rights may change this analysis to some extent); WILLIAMS, supra note 147, at 121
(“[I]n the typical case, where a divorcing family has few assets, ‘equal shares’ often means that the
wife receives an equal share of a nominal amount, or else receives an equal share of the family’s
mortgage debt.”).
220. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any
Difference?, 8 J. EMP. L. STUDS. 304, 313 tbl.1 (2011) (finding even after Oregon enacted presumption
of joint custody, mothers were awarded sole custody 59% of the time, fathers were awarded sole
custody 10% of the time, with the remainder ordering joint custody); Suzanne Reynolds et al., Back to
the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1669 (2007) (study
of North Carolina divorces finding mothers were awarded or obtained through mediation primary
custody in 232 out of 323 cases, or 72%, of cases, fathers were awarded primary custody in 41 out of
323 cases, or 13% of cases, with the remainder joint custody). The same study found mothers were
more likely to obtain primary custody in mediation than in litigation or settlement. See id.
221. In 1985, Lenore Weitzmann received widespread attention for studies that showed that
women experience a 73% decrease in their standard of living after divorce and men experience a 42%
gain. See WEITZMANN, supra note 208, at 323. Other scholars questioned the magnitude of her
findings but have generally confirmed that women’s standard of living declines far more than men’s
after a divorce. See, e.g., Patricia A. McManus & Thomas A. DiPrete, Losers and Winners: The
Financial Consequences of Separation and Divorce for Men, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 246, 246 (2001)
(collecting studies showing mixed results on whether men’s standard of living improves or declines
after divorce but concluding “[a] large body of research has established that marital disruption has a
substantial negative impact on women’s standard of living, and that this impact is worse for women
than for men”); id. at 265–66 (“[W]omen and children . . . overwhelmingly suffer serious declines in
their material well-being in the aftermath of separation and divorce.”). This study found that the
standard of living for men who had contributed 80% or more of pre-separation income in a marriage
improved after divorce but that it declined somewhat for men who had been in dual-earner marriages.
See id. at 266–67; cf. Avellar & Smock, supra note 141 (finding female cohabitors’ economic
wellbeing declined far more than male cohabitors’ upon dissolution of the relationship).
222. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 434–35 (“[I]t remains unclear whether it is better for a
vulnerable spouse today to receive a property settlement and possibly spousal support for a definite
term, compared to a somewhat more likely award of indefinite spousal support fifty years ago.”).
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from other reform approaches that more accurately gauged, or accepted,
the competing incentives embedded in the marriage equation. Notably,
courts of last resort in several states that did not adopt maintenance
statutes with time limits have recently reaffirmed that courts may
appropriately provide open-ended alimony when couples with
substantially different incomes divorce after a long marriage and the
dependent spouse cannot be realistically retrained.223 Some reform
proposals go further. For example, in 2002, the American Law Institute
(ALI) proposed a new standard for maintenance that moves away from the
expectation that both spouses will participate in the paid marketplace
during marriage. Instead, the standard would explicitly provide
“compensation” for a dependent spouse’s “residual loss in earning
capacity” due to providing a disproportionate share of caretaking, as well
as any investment in the other spouse’s earning capacity.224 This approach,
like maintenance, is formally sex-neutral; unlike maintenance, it protects
spouses (the vast majority of whom are women) who specialize in
caretaking or who subordinate paid work opportunities to meet domestic
needs during marriage. No state has yet adopted the ALI
recommendations, and I am not arguing that the ALI approach is clearly
superior to the current regime. My claim is far more modest: that
assessment of the ALI approach, the current regime, or any other potential
reform, must consider the interaction of all three factors in the marriage
equation and the extent to which the combination of law and social norms
continues to encourage women to drop out of the labor force or otherwise
subordinate their earning power during marriage.225

223. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 432 n.88 (collecting cases).
224. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§§ 5.03(1),(2)(b),(3)(a), 5.05 (2002). The ALI Principles rely heavily on a theory of alimony developed
by ALI Reporter Ira Ellman. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1989).
The proposal has engendered a significant amount of commentary, some laudatory and some critical.
See, e.g., Brito, supra note 212 (supporting the proposal on grounds it would create more predictable
uniform rules and better protect parents who assume primary caregiving responsibilities); June
Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 43 (2002) (the proposal deserves “cautious
support”); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90
IOWA L. REV. 1513 (2005) (arguing ALI approach improperly continues to see caretaking as a liability
and that partnership model would be preferable); Katherine B. Silbaugh, Money as Emotion in the
Distribution of Wealth at Divorce, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 234 (Robin Wilson ed., 2006)
(criticizing the proposal’s failure to consider non-financial aspects of marriage).
225. Assessment should also be sensitive to differences of class and race. Cf. Twila L. Perry,
Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1994)
(observing that black women receive alimony at far lower rates than white women and arguing that a
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More generally, prominent commentators have recently described
policy efforts to help (different-sex) families better balance work and
family as “stalled”226 and at an “impasse.”227 To the extent that further
reform is desirable, it is difficult to know where to put one’s efforts. In
most different-sex families, economic exchange theories, efficiency gains
from specialization, and gender norms will tend to reinforce each other.
Additionally, as noted in Part II.B, the substantive law of marriage and
related benefits likewise encourages specialization. Disentangling the
relative significance of these myriad factors is quite difficult, but same-sex
marriage offers the possibility to consider policy proposals from a fresh
perspective.
III. SAME-SEX COUPLES
Consider the quotation that opened this Article: “It never ceases to
amaze me how many people will say to us, ‘So, who’s the woman, and
who’s the man, in your marriage?’”228 This statement helps crystallize the
confluence of issues that this Article explores. First, it is important to note
that it is easy to understand what Jason Shumaker means when he says
“who’s the woman, and who’s the man” in the marriage. The studies
discussed in Part II.C simply confirm what is common knowledge: Despite
more than thirty years of formal equality in family law, the role of the
“woman” and the role of the “man” within marriage remain clear. At the
same time, the fact that this statement is made by a man who is actually
married to another man highlights the challenge that same-sex marriage
poses to these understandings. One or both husbands in the marriage may
play the role of “woman” in the marriage—that is, perform caretaking
functions—but in so doing he will be acting against gender norms. This
can (at least theoretically) weaken the intertwined assumptions that
caretaking is best performed by a woman and that it is an essential
expression of femininity. Moreover, it is crucially important that these
men are legally married under Massachusetts law. Whatever their
inclinations might be about how best to allocate responsibilities for
breadwinning and for caregiving, substantive laws and benefits of

focus on alimony as a means of providing support for women after divorce may reinforce a hierarchy
among women in which value depends on association with affluent, more typically white, men).
226. Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsibility,
4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 573–74 (2007).
227. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law
and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 17, 66 (2010).
228. Benoit Denizet-Lewis, supra note 1, at 35.
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marriage will, at the margins at least, encourage specialization by one
husband in income-producing work and one husband in domestic work
rather than an equal split of those responsibilities. These effects may be
confounded by societal understandings of what marriage “means.” In other
words, marriage may itself spur one of the men to become the “woman”
within the relationship.
As such choices are made not just by this couple but by the rapidly
growing number of married same-sex couples, researchers will be able to
develop a much richer understanding of the relative significance of gender
norms and of the substantive laws of marriage on the way in which
couples make these decisions.
A. Challenging the “Last” Sex-Based Classification
1. Gender Norms in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage
When same-sex couples first brought legal cases seeking the right to
marry in the early 1970s, their claims (if successful) would have required
modifications of those aspects of substantive marriage law that imposed
distinct rights and responsibilities on husbands and on wives. Today,
however, the formal legal import of the change sought—modification of
the requirement that marriage be between a man and woman—requires
only minimal reconsideration of substantive marriage law, since it is now
sex-neutral in almost all respects. Nonetheless, just as in the debates over
the ERA, supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage strategically
claim and disclaim the connections implicit in the marriage equation.
In 1970, Jack Baker and Michael McConnell were the first gay couple
in the United States to appeal a denial of a marriage license. Well aware of
the controversy this would generate, they held a press conference before
appearing at the clerk’s office in Minneapolis with a crowd of reporters.
The story was news across the country, and the couple explicitly situated it
as part of the larger debate over marriage. They characterized their
objective as seeking recognition for their love—but also as a hope that
“within five years we can turn the whole institution of marriage upside
down.”229 Similarly, Paul Barwick and John Singer, a couple who applied
for a marriage license in Seattle the following year, stated that they sought,
among other things, to “challenge mainstream definitions of marriage and

229. David L. Chambers, Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership, in
CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 281, 284 (John D’Emilio et al.
eds., 2000).
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the family.”230 Both couples remember being asked repeatedly “which one
was the wife” and being pleased to emphasize that they were simply two
men who sought to wed.231 In 1971, when Look, a widely read general
circulation magazine, devoted an issue to the changing American family, it
included Baker and McConnell as “‘Married’ homosexuals” along with
profiles of “The Young Unmarrieds” and “The Executive Mother.”232
Courts in Minnesota and Washington quickly disposed of the gay
couples’ claims (as did a court in Kentucky faced with a claim brought by
a lesbian couple), relying primarily on conclusory statements that marriage
was the union of a man and a woman.233 But the possibility—or, in many
minds, the threat—of gay marriage became intertwined with larger
questions of gender roles within marriage as part of the increasingly
virulent debates over the ERA.234 Phyllis Schlafly and other opponents of
the ERA seized on academic musings that suggested the ERA might lead
to legalization of gay marriage to bolster the case against the ERA.235
Schlafly explicitly linked recognition of gay rights to the traditional
gender-based assumption that husbands support their families, claiming
that enactment of the ERA would offer benefits only to “the offbeat and

230. Id.; see also DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS 291–93 (1971) (discussing varying views on
the appropriateness of seeking to expand marriage rights for gays and lesbians because of the
historically patriarchal structure of marriage).
231. Chambers, supra note 229, at 286. Likewise, when Tracy Knight attempted to wed Marjorie
Ruth Jones in Kentucky, the county attorney “became confused during his questioning about which of
the two was to be the ‘wife’ and who was the ‘husband.’” TEAL, supra note 230, at 290 (quoting Stan
MacDonald, Two Women Tell the Court Why They Would Marry, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL,
Nov. 12, 1970).
232. See Jack Star, The Homosexual Couple, LOOK, Jan. 26, 1971, at cover & 69. The pull-quote
for the article proclaims “[a]s far as Jack Baker and Michael McConnell are concerned, their
relationship ‘is just like being married.’” Id. at 69. The author carefully explains that the couple
divides up traditionally feminine tasks according to their individual preferences and skills: “In many
respects, the Baker-McConnell household is like that of any young marrieds except that there is no
male-female role-playing. Neither is a limp-wristed sissy. ‘I do the dishes,’ says Baker, ‘because I
don’t like to cook.’ ‘And I do the cooking, says McConnell, ‘because I cook better than Jack.’” Id. at
70. The article does however highlight one pertinent difference. It includes a picture of the two men
shaving, captioned with the observation that their “daily life includes some odd bits of togetherness,
like shaving.” Id.
233. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
234. For more comprehensive discussions of the role that same-sex marriage played in debates
over the ERA, see, e.g., MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 83, at 154 (describing how anti-ERA
women were jarred by the “apocalyptic future that Schlafly sketched out” for homemakers, combined
with the “abomination” that the “revolution in gender symbolized by an implicit sanction of
homosexual marriage” (emphasis in original)); Franklin, supra note 91, at 139–41 (similar); Pascoe,
supra note 90, at 92–102 (similar); Siegel, supra note 37, at 1390 (arguing Schlafly “linked together
the ERA, abortion, and homosexuality in ways that changed the meaning of each, and mobilized a
grassroots, ‘profamily constituency’ to oppose this unholy trinity”).
235. SCHLAFLY, supra note 7, at 89–90.
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the deadbeat male—that is, to the homosexual who wants the same rights
as husbands, [and] to the husband who wants to escape supporting his wife
and children.”236 These tactics proved effective. Although supporters of
the ERA consistently argued that enactment of the amendment would not
lead to gay marriage,237 and in fact it was probably extremely unlikely that
the Supreme Court of the 1970s would have interpreted the ERA to
require granting same-sex couples access to marriage, such arguments
played a key role in defeating the proposed amendment.238
In today’s debate, many opponents of same-sex marriage likewise
frame their arguments in terms of protecting traditional gender roles.
Michael Medved, a popular talk-radio host,239 is especially explicit about
the connection. Medved claims that social conservatives often “lose the
debates before we even begin” by framing gay marriage as a decision
regarding the validity or morality of homosexual attraction.240 He suggests
instead that the problem with same-sex marriage is that it “undermine[s]
the crucial importance of gender specific roles in all relationships,” which
he characterizes as a subject on which “nearly all Americans can agree.”241
He continues:
A gay couple might claim that they fill distinctive roles in their
relationship—with one woman working hard to support the family,
for instance, while the other cooks and decorates and nourishes the
kids. But choosing complementary roles for the sake of convenience
or preference isn’t the same as recognizing that these contrasting
approaches arise from your very essence as a man or a woman.
There’s something arbitrary, synthetic and, indeed, temporary about

236. Id. at 95.
237. See Pascoe, supra note 90, at 100–01. By 1977, when the National Conference on Women
was held, supporters of the ERA adopted a platform proclaiming, “ERA will NOT change or weaken
family structure. . . . ERA will NOT require States to permit homosexual marriage.” See NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INT’L WOMEN’S YEAR, THE SPIRIT OF HOUSTON: THE FIRST
NATIONAL WOMEN’S CONFERENCE 51 (1978) (emphasis in original).
238. Baker and McConnell appealed the denial of a marriage license to them to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which dismissed their case for “want of a substantial federal question.” Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
239. Talkers Magazine estimates that Medved reaches approximately 3.75 million listeners per
week, making him one of the ten most listened-to talk show hosts in the country. See The Top Talk
Radio Audiences, TALKERS MAG. (Sept. 6, 2011), http://talkers.com/top-talk-radio-audiences.
240. Michael Medved, Gender Difference, Not Gay Marriage, at Center of Family Fight,
TOWNHALL (Aug. 2, 2006), http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelmedved/2006/08/02/gender_
difference,_not_gay_marriage,_at_center_of_family_fight/page/full/.
241. Id.
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a same sex couple attempting to imitate a heterosexual marriage by
fulfilling distinct responsibilities in the relationship.242
Similar themes arise in a Manifesto in support of the “natural family”
endorsed by several influential conservative leaders.243 The Manifesto
grounds opposition to marriage rights for same-sex couples in a broader
denunciation of what it calls the “aggressive state promotion of
androgyny.”244 It decries a range of legal reforms and social changes in the
latter half of the twentieth century, including “attacks on the meaning of
‘wife’ and ‘husband’” and the “imposition of full ‘gender equality’ [that]
destroyed family-wage systems.”245 It embraces an essentialist
understanding of sex and a separate spheres ideology: young women are to
grow into “wives, homemakers, and mothers” and young men are to grow
into “husbands, homebuilders, and fathers.”246 Thus, opposition to gay
marriage is explicitly framed as part of a larger agenda to roll back modern
sex discrimination principles and reinstate laws enforcing sex-stereotyped
gender roles.
Media campaigns designed in connection with voter referenda on
same-sex marriage laws have taken this strategy to heart. As Melissa
Murray explores in detail, advertisements in the campaign in support of
California’s Proposition 8, a proposal to amend California’s constitution to
prohibit same-sex marriage, used explicit statements and subtextual gender
cues to suggest that the opposition to same-sex marriage was not about (an
arguably inappropriate) homophobia or animus to gay persons but rather

242. Id. (emphasis added). Medved elsewhere characterizes the promotion of marriage rights for
same-sex couples as “recycl[ing]” the . . . discredited ideas” of “‘Equity Feminists’ of the ’60s and
’70s” who had argued against gender roles. See Michael Medved, Gay Marriage Recycles Bad Idea,
TOWNHALL (May 21, 2008), http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelmedved/2008/05/21/gay_marriage
_recycles_bad_idea/page/full/.
243. See Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, FAM. AM., Mar.
2005, at 1, available at http://familymanifesto.net/fmDocs/FamilyManifesto.pdf. Endorsers include
Gary Bauer (former leader of the Family Research Council and currently president of American
Values), the late Jerry Falwell (former leader of the Moral Majority), Phyllis Schlafly (founder of the
Eagle Forum and, as discussed above, leader of the opposition to the ERA), Nebraska Congressman
Lee Terry, Rick Warren (evangelical minister and bestselling author), and the late Paul Weyrich (cofounder of the Heritage Foundation and later leader of the Free Congress Foundation). See Featured
Endorsements, THE NATURAL FAMILY: A MANIFESTO, http://familymanifesto.net/fm/endorsements
.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (including an extensive list of endorsers). My thanks to Reva Siegel
for bringing the Manifesto to my attention.
244. Carlson & Mero, supra note 243, at 21.
245. Id. at 11.
246. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). In a separate section, the Manifesto purports to recognize and
“believe wholeheartedly in women’s rights,” but it defines these rights as “above all” rights that
recognize “women’s unique gifts of pregnancy, birthing, and breastfeeding.” Id. at 25.
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about a (perfectly appropriate) desire to protect gender roles.247 For
example, in one ad, Jan, who likes to cook, and Tom, who enjoys mowing
the lawn, discuss how friendly they are with their gay neighbors but
explain that because they “believe[] in and want[] to teach their children
traditional family values,” they will be voting in favor of Proposition 8. 248
Another ad presents a young girl being raised by a male gay couple. Her
two fathers are flustered when she asks them, “Where do babies come
from?” Upon hearing that her friend Megan told her that babies come from
a mommy and daddy who are married, they suggest that she should spend
“less time over at Megan’s house,” thereby implicitly excluding their
daughter from education on traditional gender roles that do not exist in her
own family. The commercial concludes with a voiceover warning: “Let’s
not confuse our kids. Protect marriage by protecting the real meaning of
marriage: only between a man and a woman.”249
As I have explored in greater detail elsewhere, similar arguments are
made in legal filings (particularly amicus briefs) in the same-sex marriage
cases.250 One such argument is that men and women, simply by virtue of
their sex, provide different role models for children and that they play
“opposite” and “complementary” roles within marriage.251 The other
argument prominent in recent cases—that marriage is essential to provide
stability for different-sex couples who may accidentally procreate but not
for same-sex couples who cannot—is likewise intertwined with gender
norms.252 The fuller explication of the argument focuses on the extent to

247. Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8,
5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 366–90 (2009); see also Kathryn Abrams, Elusive Coalitions:
Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1136–37 (2010) (similar).
248. See Proposition 8—Made Simple, YOUTUBE (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vI-GjWY-WlA.
249. See Proposition 8 Commercial, YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=75J3TN9Zzck.
250. See Widiss et al., supra note 11, at 487–504.
251. See id.; see also Franklin, supra note 91, at 163–70.
252. See, e.g., Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1002 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring
in judgment) (“Unlike same-sex couples, only opposite-sex couples may experience unintentional or
unplanned procreation. State sanctioned marriage as a union of one man and one woman encourages
couples to enter into a stable relationship prior to having children and to remain committed to one
another in the relationship for the raising of children, planned or otherwise.”); Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality op.) (“[Same-sex couples] do not become parents as a result of
accident or impulse. The Legislature could find that unstable relationships between people of the
opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than
is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will
help children more.”). See also Edward Stein, The ‘Accidental Procreation’ Argument for Withholding
Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403 (2009) (discussing
emergence of this argument and its connection to earlier more general arguments that marriage is
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which marriage is necessary to protect “vulnerable” women from
“irresponsible” men who otherwise would abandon them.253 Often these
claims are couched specifically in terms of the distinct responsibilities of
“husbands” and “wives.” For example, Monte Stewart, a director of the
Marriage Law Foundation who has authored numerous briefs in same-sex
marriage litigation as well as several academic articles, opposes what he
calls the move to “genderless marriage”254 on the ground that
“man/woman marriage is the only institution that can confer the status of
husband and wife, that can transform a male into a husband or a female
into a wife (a social identity quite different from ‘partner’).”255 Lynn
Wardle, another academic who has written extensively opposing
expansion of marriage rights, likewise opines that “[l]egalizing same-sex
marriage will instantly transform the meaning of marriage, spouse,
husband, [and] wife.”256
These arguments have remained strikingly consistent even though the
legal reality of the claims has changed dramatically. When made in the
1970s, such arguments reflected the fact that the legal responsibilities of
husbands and wives were, as discussed above, significantly different.
Modern claims that recognition of same-sex marriage “threatens” the
institution of marriage by undermining the meaning of “wife” and
“husband” should be far less effective because contemporary sex
discrimination jurisprudence demands that the roles of “wife” and
“husband” are no longer legally distinct. However, as detailed in Part II.C,
these terms continue to carry a cultural resonance that is significant, and

related to procreation before ultimately concluding the accidental procreation argument is inadequate
to justify denying marriage rights to same-sex couples).
253. See Widiss et al., supra note 11, at 494–98.
254. Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006). Stewart explains that he chooses this term (“genderless
marriage”), rather than the more common terms such as same-sex marriage or gay marriage, to
emphasize that expansion of marriage rights results in a single state-marriage-available to both samesex and different-sex couples, rather than a new, different institution of “same-sex marriage.” Id. at 4
n.6. I agree with his point that it is helpful to emphasize that marriage is a single institution, although I
believe the shift towards a less gendered understanding of marriage is a positive rather than negative
development.
255. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). Stewart uses virtually identical language in his briefs. See,
e.g., Brief for United Families Int’l as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, at 17–18,
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 98084), available at http://marriagelaw
foundation.org/publications/NY%20COA%20Brief.pdf. He does admit, summarizing an argument put
forward by Nicholas Bala, that the legal significance of these terms has changed dramatically since the
1970s, Stewart, supra note 254, at 61–63, and further that “socially there is a growing ambiguity about
the roles of ‘husband’ and ‘wife.’” Id. at 63 (citation omitted).
256. Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage As the Union of a Man and a Woman, 83 N.D. L.
REV. 1365, 1377 (2008) (emphasis in original).
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thus the criticism has a certain logic (whether or not one agrees that it is
potentially harmful) when one considers the social significance the terms
still hold. Like rhetoric used to oppose the ERA, these claims reflect a
conviction—which may well be correct—that one of the best ways to fight
against changes in formal sex-based classifications (that is, recognition of
same-sex marriage) is to tap into still widely shared beliefs that men and
women should play distinct and different roles within marriage.
Those on the other side of the debate—that is, proponents of expanding
marriage rights—likewise have considered the connections between sexbased classifications and gender roles within the marriage equation.
During the 1980s and 1990s, leaders of the lesbian and gay advocacy and
scholarly community debated whether it was worth working to broaden
marriage eligibility. At that time, some of the staunchest proponents of
same-sex marriage rights supported their case in part on the grounds that it
would challenge gender norms in marriage more generally. Thomas
Stoddard, then executive director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, argued that “enlarging the concept” of marriage would “necessarily
transform it into something new. If two women can marry, or two men,
marriage—even for heterosexuals—need not be a union of a ‘husband’
and a ‘wife.’”257 Paula Ettelbrick, then legal director of the organization,
disagreed, arguing that seeking marriage rights—and thus necessarily
contending that gay couples were “just like” heterosexual couples—would
“begin the dangerous process of silencing our different voices.”258
A few years later, a conversation between law professors Nan Hunter
and Nancy Polikoff revisited these same questions.259 Hunter, like
Stoddard, argued that legalizing marriage for same-sex couples “would
have enormous potential to destabilize the gendered definition of marriage
for everyone.”260 Same-sex marriage, she contended, “could create the
model in law for an egalitarian kind of interpersonal relation”261 by
“rais[ing] the question of what, without gendered content, could the social
categories of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ mean.”262 Polikoff, on the other hand,
contended that rather than transforming the institution of marriage, the
advent of same-sex marriage would threaten to transform the relationships
of gays and lesbians. She reviewed evidence gathered by William

257. Stoddard, supra note 13, at 19. He also emphasized practical benefits that would flow from
marriage. See id.
258. Ettelbrick, supra note 14, at 22.
259. Hunter, supra note 13; Polikoff, supra note 14.
260. Hunter, supra note 13, at 12.
261. Id. at 17.
262. Id. at 16.
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Eskridge (as counsel in one of the early second-wave gay marriage cases)
on same-sex marriage in other cultures that showed that despite being of
the same sex, the spouses took on distinctly gendered—and distinctly
hierarchal—roles.263 She predicted that in seeking marriage rights, gays
and lesbians would minimize the transformative aspect of their claim and
valorize the current institution of marriage.264
When challenges to different-sex marriage laws began to succeed, the
gay and lesbian advocacy movement presented a largely unified front in
support of expanding marriage rights.265 At the time of this writing, the
major national gay and lesbian advocacy organizations have actively
supported litigation and legislative efforts to expand marriage rights. (As
noted above, in recent years, some academic commentators and individual
advocates for lesbian and gay rights have begun once again to question
publicly the focus on marriage.266) But contemporary proponents of
expanding marriage rights no longer claim that it will transform gender
roles within different-sex marriages. Rather, in response to oft-stated
claims that the advent of same-sex marriage would “destroy” the
“institution” of marriage, advocates have carefully minimized the impact
of the change they seek. Their consistent argument, particularly in public
education efforts, lobbying, and the popular press, has been that permitting
same-sex marriage would in no way affect different-sex marriages.267
Thus, as Courtney Cahill observes, advocates for expansion of marriage
rights have de-emphasized research showing that same-sex couples do
tend to differ from different-sex couples, even in ways—like the
egalitarian division of household responsibilities—that many might find
normatively attractive.268

263. Polikoff, supra note 14, at 1538–40.
264. Id. at 1540–41.
265. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 17, at 394 (discussing how advocates within the LGBT
movement who were once openly skeptical of the value of working to expand marriage rights began
fighting for marriage once it was framed as the definitive issue of gay and lesbian equality).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 24–30.
267. See, e.g., FREEDOM TO MARRY, MOVING MARRIAGE FORWARD: BUILDING MAJORITY
SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE 5, available at http://www.letcaliforniaring.org/atf/cf/%7B7a706b3a-165f-49
50-9144-2fc92fe4d8d1%7D/MOVING%20MARRIAGE%20FORWARD%20REPORT.PDF (“When
talking about the freedom to marry, share the truth: gay couples want to join marriage, not ‘change’ it,
as opponents like to threaten. . . . [W]e should talk about . . . the same rules, same responsibilities, and
same respect for all committed couples.”); Talking Points, MARRIAGE EQUALITY RHODE ISLAND,
http://www.marriageequalityri.org/www/learn/talking_points (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“The way
the law defines marriage is to give committed couples the tools they need to care for each other—
opening civil marriage to same-sex couples won’t change that.” (emphasis added)).
268. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the Differences That Could Make a Difference:
United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of Sexual Equality, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 943, 969–79 (2009).
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In a nutshell, the Stoddard/Hunter pro-marriage arguments can be
characterized as a belief that when “sex” is functionally removed from the
marriage equation, same-sex couples’ egalitarian gender norms will trump
both the specialization bias of substantive marriage law and cultural
understandings of what marriage “means.” And furthermore, by
demonstrating the possibility of a more egalitarian marriage, same-sex
marriage can change different-sex marriage. The Ettelbrick/Polikoff
critique worries by contrast that the specialization bias of substantive
marriage law and societal understandings of marriage grounded in its
patriarchal past will trump the relatively egalitarian gender norms of samesex couples. Finally, many prominent modern proponents of expanded
marriage rights simply contend that same-sex marriage is not part of the
(different-sex) marriage equation at all.
2. Sex Discrimination Claims in Court
Given the prevalence of sex-based stereotypes in justifications for
denying same-sex marriage, one might have expected claims that same-sex
marriage bans constitute sex discrimination to be successful. This has not
been the case. As of March 2012, several state courts of last resort have
held denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples unconstitutional,269 but
none of these decisions relies on sex discrimination rationales.270 Rather,
courts (both those that rule for plaintiffs on other grounds and those that
deny plaintiffs’ claims entirely) typically conclude that, despite the use of
sex-based classifications, heightened scrutiny is not merited because men
and women are disadvantaged equally: Neither (gay) men nor (lesbian)
women can marry the spouse of their choice.271 The putative legal equality
269. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Additionally, California held a state statute that limited marriage to different-sex couples
unconstitutional. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), but later held that a
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage was constitutionally permissible. See Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
270. For detailed discussion of courts’ treatment of sex discrimination claims, see Widiss et al.,
supra note 11, at 468–72. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the sex-based classifications in the
marriage statute required strict scrutiny and remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the state could provide a sufficiently compelling justification. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The case was subsequently mooted when Hawaii enacted a constitutional
amendment limiting marriage in the state to the union of a man and a woman. See HAW. CONST. art. 1,
§ 23.
271. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he restriction of marriage
to opposite-sex couples is subject only to rational basis scrutiny . . . [because it] does not put men and
women in different classes, and give one class a benefit not given to the other.”); Andersen v. King
Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006) (holding that because “[m]en and women are treated
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of husbands and wives is used as grounds to reject sex-stereotyping
claims. Courts reason that the separate spheres ideology is no longer
enforced in law and the prior reform of marriage law is not relevant to the
current debate.272
Elsewhere, I have argued that these conclusions are unfounded.
Arguments against same-sex marriage are permeated with assumptions
about appropriate gender roles. These justifications should be recognized
as inadequate under anti-stereotyping doctrine.273 But the fact that courts
embrace these justifications—e.g., that it is a “commonsense premise that
children will do best with a mother and a father in the home”274—helps
highlight just how natural such gendered assumptions still seem. Courts
also reaffirm the significance of sex-based classifications in their
substantive Due Process analysis. In that context, courts consistently hold
that “marriage” is “fundamental” because it is “deeply rooted in the
Nation’s history and tradition,” but that a separate status they call “samesex marriage” is not.275 In other words, they reify the man/woman aspect
of marriage as inherent to the meaning of marriage.
The district court decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (now Perry v.
Brown),276 the federal court challenge to California’s Proposition 8, is an
important exception to the approach described above. The district court
reviewed copious historical evidence.277 It concluded that the core of the
right to “marriage” has been and remains the right to “choose a spouse
and, with mutual consent, join together and form a household,” and
changes in the racial and sex-based requirements associated with marriage
identically under [the state’s] DOMA” it does not discriminate on the basis of sex). As Mary Anne
Case argues persuasively, this matter-of-fact acceptance of such “equal” classifications is out of line
with sex discrimination decisions in other contexts. See Case, supra note 17, at 1219–21.
272. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (“It is one thing to show that
long-repealed marriage statutes subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is quite
another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws excluded same-sex couples because of
incorrect and discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion.”);
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989 (“[T]here is nothing in [the state’s] DOMA that speaks to gender
stereotyping within marriage.”).
273. See Widiss et al., supra note 11, at 487–504.
274. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8; see also, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (similar); id. at 1005–
06 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment) (“[B]ecause of the nonfungible differences between men and
women, . . . [same-sex marriage’s] differences from the optimum mother/father setting for stable
family life may offer distinctive disadvantages.”).
275. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9; see also, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 207, 209 (N.J.
2006) (same); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976, 978 (same). For a more detailed discussion of this analysis,
see Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 23, at 1391–93.
276. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affirmed sub nom.
Perry v. Brown.
277. See id.
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have not changed this core meaning.278 The court therefore held that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was “an artifact of a time
when the genders were seen as having distinct roles in society and in
marriage.”279 Accordingly, the court rejected proponents’ claim that the
plaintiffs in the case sought a “new right” to same-sex marriage,
explaining rather that they sought the same thing “opposite-sex couples
across the state enjoy—namely, marriage.”280 I believe this approach
appropriately recognizes the interrelationship of Due Process analysis with
sex-discrimination analysis, but the Perry court stands virtually alone in its
approach. Notably, although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, it did so on the
relatively narrow ground that there was no legitimate justification for
stripping from same-sex couples the right to marry that the state had
previously permitted; the Ninth Circuit did not reach the broader question
of whether simply denying marriage rights to same-sex couples violates
the Constitution, and accordingly it did not address the lower court’s Due
Process or sex discrimination analysis.281 At the time of this writing, it
remains to be seen whether the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the
issue.
B. Disaggregating Gender
Contemporary advocates of expanded marriage rights are reluctant to
suggest that recognition of same-sex marriages will change different-sex
marriages.282 This may well be a smart strategy from litigation, public
relations, and fundraising perspectives—and it certainly is an
understandable response to the apocalyptic claims of those opposing
expansion of marriage rights. But now that same-sex marriage exists, these
previously academic debates have on-the-ground significance. They are no
longer abstract musing about gender roles. Rather, they are the day-to-day
decisions made by (newly married) same-sex couples around the country.
Will one husband drop out of the paid workforce to stay home with
children while the other husband provides income? Will one wife focus on
advancing her career while the other wife provides domestic support?

278. Id. at 993.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328, at *16-*18 (9th
Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
282. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
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Simply asking the questions highlights the potentially transformative
impact of the reality.
This transformation could occur in two ways. The first—and the one
that is typically assumed by opponents of same-sex marriage—is that the
mere fact of state recognition of same-sex marriage will weaken the
gendered understanding of spousal roles within different-sex marriages.
This likewise was the position advanced by earlier proponents of same-sex
marriage such as Thomas Stoddard and Nan Hunter.283 A few researchers
have tried to assess whether such effects exist by studying European
countries where legal recognition of same-sex relationships (often not
called marriages) predates recognition of such relationships in the United
States. Some have claimed to find significant effects; others find little or
no effect.284
The second way that the new reality of same-sex marriage could
change marriage is by permitting enhanced understanding of the relative
importance of gender norms compared to substantive marriage law in how
couples make decisions, particularly decisions related to the allocation of
income-producing and caregiving responsibilities. Whether or not the
simple existence of same-sex married couples will transform gender roles,
the new reality of same-sex marriage offers a natural experiment that
can—and I think should—inform policy debates regarding marriage more
generally. In other words, it offers the possibility of pulling apart the
marriage equation.
This premise begins by recognizing that in different-sex couples, it is
often difficult to disaggregate the relative significance of efficiency gains
from specialization, economic exchange dynamics, and gender pressures,
since they all tend to mutually reinforce a traditional gendered divide
within a family. Same-sex relationships therefore offer the opportunity to
help identify the distinct roles that sex, gender, and societal expectations
play in the division of responsibilities within families. In 1983, Philip
Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz published a book with the results of the
first large-scale study of married (heterosexual) couples, unmarried

283. See supra notes 257, 260 and accompanying text.
284. Compare Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The “Conservative Case” for
Same-Sex Marriage Collapses, 9 WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26 (claiming recognition of
same-sex marriage contributed to declining marriage rates for heterosexual couples), and M. Van
Mourick et al., Good for Gays, Bad for Marriage, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 11, 2004, at A16 (similar),
with WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006) (finding small positive effects on culture of
marriage following recognition of same-sex relationships), and BADGETT, supra note 8, at 64–85
(finding little to no effects on marriage behavior or beliefs of heterosexuals).
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heterosexual couples, and same-sex couples in long-term relationships.285
They found that most heterosexual married couples still divided
responsibilities along distinctly gendered lines; same-sex couples, by
contrast, divided housework and decision-making more equally. The
authors noted, however, that same-sex couples accordingly lost some of
the “efficienc[ies]” associated with traditional gender roles.286
Numerous studies conducted more recently have likewise found that
lesbian and gay couples divide housework much more equally than
different-sex couples.287 As one researcher put it, “[A]lthough members of
gay and lesbian couples do not divide household labor in a perfectly equal
manner, they are more likely than members of heterosexual couples to
negotiate a balance between achieving a fair distribution of household
labor and accommodating the different interests, skills, and work
schedules of particular partners.”288 One of the most detailed examinations
is a study that compared same-sex couples who registered for civil unions
during the first year that they were legalized in Vermont with their married
heterosexual siblings.289 The researchers determined that, as they expected,
the lesbian and gay couples divided responsibility for housework
considerably more equally than heterosexual couples; in fact, referring to
the various economic and gender-related theories put forth to explain
different-sex couples’ division of responsibilities, the researchers observed
that sexual orientation was a stronger predictor of equality of division than
income. That is, same-sex couples with significantly different incomes not
only divided house work more equally than different-sex couples with
significantly different incomes, but also more equally than different-sex
couples with similar incomes.290

285. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983).
286. Id. at 324–25.
287. See, e.g., Letitia Anne Peplau & Leah R. Spalding, The Close Relationships of Lesbians, Gay
Men, and Bisexuals, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS: A SOURCEBOOK 111 (2000) (collecting studies);
Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam W. Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 58
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 405 (2007) (same); Mally Shechory & Riva Ziv, Relationships between Gender
Role Attitudes, Role Division, and Perception of Equity Among Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian
Couples, 56 SEX ROLES 629, 630 (2007) (same).
288. Lawrence A. Kurdek, What Do We Know About Gay and Lesbian Couples?, 14 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 251, 252 (2005); see also Lawrence A. Kurdek, The Allocation of
Household Labor by Partners in Gay and Lesbian Couples, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 132 (2007) (similar).
289. See Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 572.
290. See id. Notably, since the heterosexual couples included a sibling of the gay or lesbian
couple, the background and upbringing was similar for at least half of each couple, “rais[ing] questions
about how women and men are socialized to assume gendered roles in adult relationships.” Id. at 573.
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Many studies of lesbian parents also find that they share childcare
responsibilities considerably more equally than different-sex parents.291
For example, one study that looked specifically at lesbian couples
transitioning into parenthood recorded consistent efforts by the couples to
develop special “mothering” opportunities for the non-biological mom,
such as taking on bath-time routines.292 In sharp contrast to different-sex
couples, where the birth of a child often signals not only a decrease in the
mother’s paid work hours but an increase in the father’s, several of the
couples reported that both the biological and the non-biological mother
decreased paid work hours to better accommodate childcare
responsibilities.293 Another study, which compared lesbian couples raising
children to heterosexual couples, likewise found that lesbian mothers in a
couple each tended to spend about the same number of hours each week in
paid employment and to split childcare responsibilities relatively equally,
while in heterosexual families, fathers spent twice as much time in paid
employment as their wives and considerably less time providing direct
childcare.294 Although there are far fewer studies of gay male parents,
several also find relatively co-equal parenting.295
Of course, these findings do not mean gender does not matter in samesex couples. Rather, they simply suggest that when both members of the
couple are the same sex and thus receive similar gendered “conditioning,”
they may more readily share responsibilities both within and outside the
home more equally. Same-sex couples typically state that their normative
ideal is equal sharing of home and work responsibilities, although this may
also depend in part on dimensions of race and class.296

291. See, e.g., Timothy J. Biblarz & Evren Savci, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Families, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 480 (2010) (collecting studies); Charlotte J. Patterson, Family
Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1052, 1054 (2000) (same); Peplau &
Fingerhut, supra note 287, at 415 (same).
292. See Abbie E. Goldberg & Maureen Perry-Jenkins, The Division of Labor and Perceptions of
Parental Roles: Lesbian Couples Across the Transition to Parenthood, 24 J. SOC. & PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 297, 308–09 (2007).
293. Id. at 314.
294. Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Division of Labor Among Lesbian and Heterosexual Parenting
Couples: Correlates of Specialized Versus Shared Patterns, 11 J. ADULT DEV. 179, 187 (2004). The
researchers also found that despite similar educational background, heterosexual mothers had less
prestigious paid work than heterosexual fathers or than lesbian mothers. Id.
295. See, e.g., SUZANNE M. JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM 156–58 &
tbl.9.5 (2002) (finding gay male couples reported dividing childcare responsibilities relatively
equally); Biblarz & Savci, supra note 291, at 487 (collecting studies showing relatively equal sharing).
296. See, e.g., Patterson et al., supra note 294, at 183; but cf. Mignon R. Moore, Gendered Power
Relationships among Women: A Study of Household Decision Making in Black, Lesbian Stepfamilies,
73 AM. SOC. REV. 335, 343, 348 (2008) (suggesting this may differ for black lesbians).
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There have been a handful of studies that suggest greater levels of
specialization within gay and lesbian couples than the studies discussed
above. A review of California census data found that about the same
percentage of same-sex and different-sex couples raising children had only
one wage earner.297 Some studies have found that in lesbian couples where
one mother is biologically related to the child, it is relatively common for
her to take on greater childcare responsibilities, even after biological
differences—such as ability to breastfeed—are no longer salient.298 A
recent study of black lesbians in “step-parent” relationships (that is, where
children were born in a prior heterosexual relationship) concluded that
these couples were less likely than their white lesbian counterparts to pool
financial resources or to divide childcare or domestic responsibilities
equally.299 Specialization may occur even without these child-related
distinctions. An older qualitative study of fifty-two long-term gay and
lesbian couples, very few of whom had children, found quite high levels of
specialization.300
Such findings of specialization within gay and lesbian couples merit
further exploration. Key factors to consider may be the extent to which
race, class, duration of relationships, age or age differential between
members of the couple, genetic or gestational relationships (or lack
thereof) to children, or “step-parent” relationships may affect couples’
decision-making regarding the allocation of domestic responsibilities.
Methodological distinctions may also be important. For example, one
researcher suggests his findings of relatively high levels of specialization

297. See Gary J. Gates, CENSUS SNAPSHOT: CALIFORNIA LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL
POPULATION 4 (2008), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/GatesRamos-CA-Snapshot-Oct-2008.pdf (finding 39% of same-sex couples raising children included only
one wage earner, compared with 42% of different-sex couples). These rates are both very high
compared to national averages. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2007 14 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hhfam/p20-561.pdf (24% of married-couple family groups included a stay-at-home mother). The national
study does not calculate the percentage of married family groups that included a stay-at-home father,
but estimates that there are 165,000 families with a stay-at-home father, a tiny fraction of the
approximately 5.6 million families with a stay-at-home mother. See id. at n.19. In part, the difference
between the California figures and the national figures may reflect different terminology, since the
U.S. census study also finds that 34% of married couples with children had only one wage earner.
298. See Jordan B. Downing & Abbie E. Goldberg, Lesbian Mothers’ Constructions of the
Division of Paid and Unpaid Labor, 21 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 100 (2011); see also Biblarz & Staci,
supra note 291, at 483 (collecting studies).
299. See Moore, supra note 296.
300. CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE
AMONG LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 184–206 (1999). Carrington classified thirteen of the families as
achieving a rough “parity” in their domestic obligations and thirty-eight in which one member of the
couple specialized in domestic work. Id. at 184, 187.
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may stem in part from shadowing his subjects and conducting back-toback interviews, rather than relying on self-reports or joint interviews,
which can be subject to purposeful or inadvertent distortions.301 He
proposed that the phenomenon of correcting for “gender deviance,”
documented in different-sex couples,302 may play in reverse for same-sex
couples, with such couples “correcting” for gender deviance by claiming
the split is more equal than it actually is.303 And, as further discussed
below, the existence of legal marriage, other legal statuses (such as civil
unions), or non-legal commitment ceremonies may affect the likelihood of
specialization as well.
Despite such variation, it is fair to conclude that the majority of current
studies find that same-sex couples share responsibilities for childrearing
and for housework more equally than different-sex couples, and that they
also tend to work more equal hours outside the home. Thus, naturally,
researchers have suggested that gay and lesbian couples may be a model
for different-sex couples. The Vermont researchers, for example, suggest
that “[s]ame-sex couples are a model for ways of equalizing the division of
housework.”304 These echo the claims made a generation ago by Thomas
Stoddard and Nan Hunter that recognition of marriage rights for same-sex
couples could help upend the separate spheres mentality for different-sex
couples.305 Although, as noted above, current advocates for marriage rights
tend to eschew such arguments, a few commentators in the popular press
have picked up on this theme.306 There is potential here—but it may be
illusory. These claims overlook a key factor that is generally ignored: the
data sets used in these studies uniformly predate legal marriage for samesex couples.
C. Disaggregating Marriage
The empirical and qualitative studies described in the previous sub-part
typically compare heterosexual married couples to same-sex couples in
long-term relationships. These differ in two significant ways. The first,
and the one that has been the focus of the studies, is obviously whether the
members of the couple are of the same or different sexes. The second
distinction is whether the couple is married or not. Although the latter

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 176.
See MAHONEY, supra note 192.
See CARRINGTON, supra note 300, at 52–53, 216–18.
Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 572.
See supra notes 257, 260–62 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Parker-Pope, supra note 19; Belkin, supra note 19.
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distinction is rarely considered significant in the study design, and in fact
is often completely ignored, it may be an important factor.307 None of the
data sets used in the studies described in the previous part include married
same-sex couples.308 That is likely soon to change. A rapidly growing
number of states permit same-sex couples to marry or have created a
status, such as civil union or domestic partnership, that provides all of the
state-level benefits of marriage. As of March 2012, Connecticut, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia, have legalized same-sex
marriage, and California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oregon, and Rhode Island have state laws providing the equivalent of
spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state.309 Even before New
York legalized same-sex marriage in the summer of 2011, researchers
estimated that approximately 50,000 same-sex couples in this country had
married, and that another 85,000 same-sex couples had entered civil
unions or domestic partnerships.310 New York’s enactment of marriage
legislation doubled the percentage of same-sex couples living in states that
permit them to marry.311
The new reality thus offers significant potential for disaggregating the
elements of the marriage equation to better understand the relative
significance of each factor in how couples make decisions. The studies
discussed in Part III.B, showing that same-sex couples are more likely
than different-sex couples to participate equally in the workforce and to

307. A few studies mention the absence of legal marriage as a potential factor that merits future
study. See, e.g., Patterson et al., supra note 198, at 188. Lee Badgett offers a fuller discussion of the
possible implication of the absence of the legal benefits of marriage on the specialization—or lack
thereof—of lesbian couples. See M. V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE
ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 160–63 (2001).
308. The Solomon et al., supra note 19, study of members of civil unions in Vermont is a partial
exception, since civil unions provide the rights and benefits of marriage, albeit without the actual
moniker of “marriage.” However, Vermont does not have a residency requirement for eligibility for
civil unions and, since Vermont was the first state to recognize a legal status comparable to marriage,
many out-of-state couples registered for civil unions. Id. at 561–62. Accordingly, only one-fifth of the
couples in the study were from Vermont. Id. at 564. At the point where the study was conducted, no
other state recognized civil unions as granting the benefits of marriage under state law. Thus, the vast
majority of study participants had minimal or no legal benefits from their civil union status.
309. See sources cited supra note 16. Additionally, Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin provide at
least some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples that register as domestic partners. See
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 16.
310. See Press Release, Williams Inst., supra note 15.
311. Press Release, Williams Inst., Extending Marriage to Same-Sex Couples in New York Will
Impact Over 42,000 Couples Raising 14,000 Children in the State (June 15, 2011), available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/extending-marriage-to-same-sex-couples-innew-york-press-release-jun-2011.
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divide household responsibilities equally, may simply reflect the necessity
that as an unmarried couple, each individual will do more to “look out” for
his or her own interests. The absence of a legal union could also make it
prohibitively expensive or impossible to achieve certain benefits that can
flow from specialization in different-sex married couples.312 If this is the
case, the more rights of marriage that same-sex couples can access, the
more likely one would begin to see a division of responsibilities—
including one member of a family dropping out of, or minimizing
participation in, the paid workforce—that mirror those of heterosexual
married couples. At the margins, at least, the combination of substantive
marriage laws and tax and benefits policies will push a couple towards
specialization.313
Future studies that use data from same-sex couples who are married
thus can greatly increase our understanding of the relative importance of
such legal rights. Significantly, it is not possible to fully compare samesex married couples to different-sex married couples because the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denies same-sex couples the many
federal benefits of marriage.314 The U.S. General Accounting Office has
determined that there are 1,138 federal statutes that reference marriage;
DOMA provides that same-sex couples are not recognized as “married” in
any of these contexts.315 This means, among other things, that same-sex
couples cannot file their federal taxes as a married couple, are not eligible
for social security spousal benefits, and cannot sponsor a spouse for
immigration status. (For any given couple, the inapplicability of federal
law may not be an unmitigated disadvantage. For example, as discussed
above, under federal law, some married couples face a “marriage penalty”
relative to the amount that they would pay as single persons;316 thus, for

312. The specific tax, pension, social security, and welfare benefits discussed above are simply
unavailable to same-sex couples who cannot marry. Some of the other benefits of marriage,
particularly upon divorce or death, may be achieved through private contract. This is expensive and
time-consuming. Further, to the extent that a couple disagrees (for example, a breadwinning spouse
might be unwilling to pre-commit to income-sharing upon divorce), the shift from the legal default
applied in marriage—income earned during a marriage is shared—to the legal default applied to
cohabitors—income earned during a marriage is separate—can be quite significant. See supra text
accompanying notes 140–41.
313. Importantly, this may be true whether or not couples identify accessing legal rights as a key
reason for their choice to marry. Cf. Kimberly D. Richman, By Any Other Name: The Social and Legal
Stakes of Same-Sex Marriage, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 357, 367–69, 372–77 (2010) (reporting that in
interviews, same-sex couples typically identified legal rights as comparatively less important than love
and public validation in reasons they chose to marry).
314. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
315. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 47.
316. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
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same-sex married couples with relatively equal incomes, the inability to
file joint federal taxes may actually reduce the aggregate amount of taxes
they owe, as well as permit them to engage in a range of other taxavoidance strategies.317) DOMA also permits states to refuse to recognize
out-of-state marriages between persons of the same sex, meaning that if
same-sex couples move from a jurisdiction that permits marriage to one
that does not, they will no longer have the state benefits of marriage
either.318
In July 2010, a federal district court held that the portions of DOMA
that preclude federal recognition of same-sex marriages are
unconstitutional.319 President Obama has since declared that his
administration would no longer defend the constitutionality of those
provisions in pending challenges,320 although U.S. House of
Representatives’ Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group has stepped in to make
the defense.321 The ultimate resolution of these cases is uncertain. The
demise of DOMA would obviously be a significant benefit for same-sex
married couples, and one that I believe is warranted under existing
constitutional principles and as a matter of good policy. That said, the
current moment, when the federal benefits of marriage are not available,
offers the opportunity, which may be fleeting, to compare the relative
significance of aspects of federal law that push couples towards
specialization and aspects of state law that do. If decisions striking down
the provisions of DOMA that limit access to federal benefits are upheld, or
if DOMA were repealed, there would be greater opportunity for a true
comparison between different-sex and same-sex married couples, but
researchers would lose the possibility to probe the relative significance of
the state versus federal factors. Accordingly, studies completed in the

317. See generally Theodore Soto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1529 (2008) (demonstrating how gay couples could arrange their affairs to pay federal
income taxes at significantly lower rates than different-sex couples with the same economic
circumstances).
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
319. See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), appeal pending;
Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), appeal
pending. A handful of other lower courts have likewise held that this section of DOMA is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Golinski v. United States Office of Personal Mgmt., No. C-10-00257 (N.D.
Ca. Feb. 22, 2012), appeal pending; In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 576 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). There
are several other pending cases.
320. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2011/February/11-ag-222.html.
321. Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House, to Nancy Pelosi, Democratic Leader of
the House (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://www.speaker.gov/UploadedFiles/DOMALetter.pdf.
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current legal regime may be a helpful counterpoint to future studies if
DOMA is repealed or struck down as unconstitutional.
The current variability in legal recognition among states should also
encourage the development of studies that probe in a more fine-grained
manner how the discrete elements of “marriage” may impact couples’
decision-making. That is, this Article has focused primarily on the
substantive legal rights and benefits afforded by marriage law. Marriage
also carries significant social meaning, what might be characterized as the
“expressive value” of marriage. And marriage is a statement by a couple to
each other that they are committed to a long-term, ideally life-long,
relationship. When different-sex couples marry, they simultaneously enjoy
all of these aspects of marriage, and all three likely play a role in how
couples choose to allocate responsibilities.322 A couple might choose to
specialize into breadwinning and caregiving roles not only because the
substantive rights and benefits of marriage law encourage it, but also
because they have committed to each other that they will function as an
integrated family unit for the foreseeable future, and because societal
understandings of marriage endorse this choice as permissible and, for
many, normatively desirable.
In states where same-sex couples are permitted to actually marry, they,
like different-sex couples, gain access to all three aspects of marriage
(with the important caveat, discussed above, that they do not enjoy the
federal benefits of marriage). In states where same-sex couples are
permitted to form civil unions or domestic partnerships, but are not
permitted to marry, they achieve the rights and benefits of marriage, and
they make the commitment to each other, but they enjoy less of the
expressive value. In states that permit neither marriage nor access to a
comparable legal status, same-sex couples may nonetheless choose to
celebrate their union with a commitment ceremony or private marriage.
These couples are consciously making a commitment to each other, but
they are not obtaining the legal rights and benefits of marriage (although
they may duplicate some of them through private contract law), and they
do not obtain the full expressive value of marriage. Studies could be
designed that use the existing “laboratory of the states” to better
understand the relative significance of the legal, social, and personal
aspects of marriage. This too may be a time-limited opportunity. The
federal challenge to California’s Proposition 8 may well reach the U.S.

322. See, e.g., Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, The Economics of the Marriage Contract:
Theories and Evidence, 51 J. LAW & ECON. 59, 63–65 (2008) (collecting studies seeking to evaluate
the social, commitment, and signaling-benefits that marriage provides).
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Supreme Court. If the Court were to find that California’s law was
unconstitutional on grounds that invalidated other states’ bans, the
variation among states would quickly end. Again, as a matter of
constitutional law and fundamental fairness, I believe this would be
appropriate, but it would foreclose a fruitful line of potential research.
The extent of legal recognition of marriage and derivative benefits is
not the only factor that could affect how same-sex versus different-sex
married couples divide responsibilities. One of the most important
differences may be the rate of childrearing. Although some studies have
found that the proportion of lesbian households with children is
comparable to the proportion in heterosexual women’s households, others
report lower rates.323 And gay male households are less likely to have
children.324 Since specialization among different-sex couples increases
dramatically as children enter the equation, and also varies with the
number of children a couple is raising, this could be a very significant
factor. It would interact dynamically, however, with the advent of
marriage rights, especially since many same-sex couples seek to marry
precisely to obtain protections for children.
Additionally, as noted above, same-sex marriages are not immune from
societal pressures related to gender roles. Engrained gender-based
assumptions may put pressure on same-sex couples just as they do on
different-sex couples. It could be that on average gay male couples react to
these possibilities differently from female lesbian couples. That is, perhaps
studies will show that gay male couples will more typically both work
full-time jobs and outsource domestic obligations, while lesbian couples
will more typically both work part-time jobs and share childcare and
domestic responsibilities.325 Or more strikingly, it could be the opposite.326
This offers an additional opportunity for analyzing, in a different way, the
relative significance of gender compared to marriage in both same-sex and
different-sex relationships.327
The complex way in which legal marriage interacts with social norms,
and the extent that this could affect results, would also need to be

323. See, e.g., BADGETT, supra note 307, at 153–55 (collecting studies).
324. See id.
325. Cf. CARRINGTON, supra note 300, at 186–87 (discussing relatively young male-couples that
rely on the service economy for domestic needs).
326. See Ginia Bellafante, Two Fathers, with One Happy to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2004, at A1, A1 (citing research based on census reports that 26% of gay male couples, 25% of
different-sex couples, and 22% of lesbian couples include a stay-at-home parent).
327. See also Schacter, supra note 17, at 400–01 (making a similar point).

792

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:721

considered.328 For example, imagine that a study of same-sex married
couples in Massachusetts found higher rates of specialization than earlier
studies of unmarried same-sex couples. This could support my
hypothesis—that is, that legal marriage encourages specialization. Or it
could be that those gay couples who choose to marry are, on average,
more drawn to a relationship that embraces specialization than the gay
population studied before legalization of marriage;329 in fact, some
individuals who were not open about their sexual orientation before
legalization of marriage might come out post-legalization. On the other
hand, some gay couples who marry might consciously desire to challenge
the traditional institution of marriage, or as earlier advocates put it, to
“turn the whole institution of marriage upside down;”330 this could
likewise shape behavior but for reasons rather different than the reasons
typically thought to explain different-sex couples’ choices. State-based
variation could also be important. The experience of couples in Iowa,
where the state supreme court decision mandating gay marriage led to a
significant backlash and the unseating of several justices,331 might differ
from the experience of couples in Massachusetts, where most reports
suggest gay marriage has been relatively uncontroversial and spurred
greater acceptance of gay families.332
Beyond considerations that relate particularly to legalization of
marriage, other factors discussed above, such as race, class, duration of
couples’ relationships, biological relationships to children, nature of
employment, etc., may all play a role in couples’ decision-making. Despite
the complexity posed by such potentially confounding variables, the fact
that same-sex marriages now exist in a growing number of jurisdictions
offers a significant, and potentially time-limited, opportunity to probe the
relative significance of sex, gender, and the law of marriage.

328. My thanks to Cary Franklin and to Suzanna Walters for conversations that helped me
articulate these points.
329. This is a challenge that has long faced researchers studying different-sex couples. See supra
note 152 and accompanying text. With respect to gay couples, comparisons between states that have
legalized marriage and those that have not might be able to correct in part for this.
330. See Chambers, supra note 229 (quoting Jack Baker, a plaintiff in the first significant samesex marriage case litigated in this country).
331. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2010, at A1.
332. See, e.g., Final Report of the N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL,
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 20–24 (2008), available
at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf (discussing positive experience of
legalization in Massachusetts and contrasting that to New Jersey’s experience with civil unions).
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CONCLUSION: EQUALITY RECONSIDERED
Current proposals to address the imbalance in caretaking functions
provided by men and women during marriage fall generally into two
camps.333 The first camp argues that gender roles are so deeply entrenched
in society that we need policies specifically designed (and potentially
employing sex-specific requirements) to counter these norms and thus
enforce a more equal sharing of responsibility between men and women.334
The second approach, by contrast, suggests that gender roles are so deeply
entrenched, or that they respond to actual biological or physiological
differences between men and women, that rather than striving for an
“equal” split of household and workplace responsibilities between men
and women, we instead need to revalue the feminine contribution and
make it easier for women to spend time out of the paid workforce, at least
when their children are young.335 Notably, neither of these common
approaches considers the effect that substantive marriage law may play in
how couples make decisions.
The marriage equation framework shows how the new reality of
marriage rights for same-sex couples offers the opportunity to approach
these questions from a fresh perspective. Carefully designed quantitative
or qualitative research comparing same-sex and different-sex married
couples can play a central role in teasing out the relative importance of
sex, gender norms, and the laws and benefits of marriage. It will be many
years before researchers have a sufficient body of data and analysis of
such data to make credible statements regarding general patterns. That
said, broadly speaking, two potential findings could emerge. One is that,
notwithstanding marriage, same-sex couples continue to share
responsibilities on the home and work front relatively equally. This would
suggest that gender is the key factor in different-sex couples’
specialization and that current reform efforts centered on reshaping or
accommodating gender norms are the appropriate mechanism to address
the ongoing imbalance.
333. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 226, at 573–74 (summarizing the “two most prominent
perspectives”); WILLIAMS, supra note 147, at 226–30 (similar).
334. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 186, at 385 (suggesting that to claim custody a parent would need
to show a pre-existing “significant (defined in terms of time) relationship” with his or her child);
Selmi, supra note 190, at 712–13, 770–81 (suggesting mandatory paternity leave or rewards for
employers that adopt policies that successfully increase paternity leave).
335. See, e.g., Suk, supra note 227, at 53 (arguing that if most mothers desire to take a maternity
leave, then a “paternalistic” policy that mandates such a leave protects the interests of the majority
against “superwomen” who would return to work immediately).
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The other potential result is that upon being permitted to marry—
particularly if DOMA is repealed or overturned—same-sex couples will
move away from sharing responsibilities for children and housework
relatively equally and towards specialization. This would suggest that the
law and social significance of marriage is comparatively more important
than sex or gender in encouraging specialization in couples. Such findings
could expose a disconnect in a structure of marriage law that encourages
specialization during marriage but that, upon divorce, treats such
specialization as an individual choice for which the dependent spouse
must bear the consequences. If one embraces a normative ideal of
marriage as a partnership in which spouses equally share responsibilities
for breadwinning and caretaking, this finding would suggest that reforms
should focus on modifying, or, more provocatively, dismantling the
substantive law and benefits that flow from marriage itself.336
Some might argue, however, that the advent of same-sex marriage also
invites reconsideration of the normative vision of equality within
marriage. Perhaps, rather than idealizing a marriage in which both spouses
equally share breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities, it is
appropriate to accept and expect a certain level of specialization in many
marriages. This could call for more flexible workplace policies to
accommodate caregiving in conjunction with paid work and more robust
protections for a spouse who does such caregiving in the event of divorce.
In the past, it would have been almost impossible to disaggregate such a
statement from gender-based assumptions regarding which spouse would
play the caretaking role. And some policymakers and theorists would
likely reject such a vision of equality categorically because they assume
that it would perpetuate the inferiority and subordination of women. This
is a valid concern. Domestic roles are still little valued in our society and
are still largely filled by women. However, policies crafted today or in the
future to accommodate caregiving within families are necessarily different
from the sex-specific responsibilities of wives that they replace. The
simple reality of same-sex married couples, as well as the relatively small
but growing number of different-sex couples in which it is the husband,
rather than the wife, who drops out of or minimizes participation in the
paid workplace, changes the story.

336. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 29 (advocating allocation of state
benefits on the basis of caretaker-dependent relationships rather than marital relationships).

